

Enemy Criminal Law in Brazil: Permanent Prevention, Faction Neutralization, and Jurisdiction Restoration

Enemy Criminal Law in Brazil: Permanent Prevention, Faction Neutralization, And Jurisdictional Restoration

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Abstract: This article advocates for the permanent and auditable adoption of the Enemy Criminal Law (DPi) to confront factions that deny the validity of the law and exercise territorial and prison governance in Brazil. Based on Jakobs, the article distinguishes between the criminal law of the citizen and the treatment of the enemy as a collective actor that threatens order, emphasizing prevention and the neutralization of capabilities (command, communication, finance, logistics). An analysis of the Brazilian reality shows that poorly managed prisons produce criminal power, that "cheap obedience" indicates strong factional governance, and that episodic operations do not dismantle structures. Inspired by the experience of El Salvador, the article outlines an arrangement for swiftly encircling leaders, effectively breaking intramural command, and deeply entrenching the State's institutional presence in the territories. Paths to achieving compatibility with the Constitution and, alternatively, hypotheses for constitutional reform are discussed. Success is measured by the sustained loss of factional rule, the blocking of new flows of illicit resources, and the restoration of state jurisdiction, not by repressive volume.

Keywords: Enemy Criminal Law; Criminal factions; Prison governance; Prevention; Sovereignty.

Abstract: This paper argues for a permanent and auditable Enemy Criminal Law framework to confront criminal factions that deny the rule of law and exert territorial and prison governance in Brazil. Grounded in Jakobs' theory, it distinguishes citizen criminal law from the treatment of the enemy as a collective actor threatening the legal order, highlighting prevention and the neutralization of capacities (command, communication, finance, logistics). Brazil's reality reveals prisons that often produce, rather than neutralize, criminal power; that "low-cost obedience" signals strong factional governance; and that episodic operations do not dismantle structures. Drawing on El Salvador's experience, the paper outlines the swift encirclement of leaders, an effective break of prison-based command, and dense institutional state presence in affected areas. It explores constitutional accommodation and, alternatively, the need for constitutional reform. Success is measured by sustained loss of factional governance, blockage of new illicit financial flows, and restoration of state jurisdiction—rather than raw enforcement volume.

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Introduction

The expansion of factions with territorial and prison governance has eroded public authority in Brazil, raising social costs and normalizing "de facto" exception zones in peripheral areas. the hypothesis that the Criminal Law of the Enemy, permanent and compatible with the Constitution, must coexist with the citizen's criminal law as a stable subsystem of protection of the legal order-constitutional against organizations that systematically deny the validity of the Law. It is not a question of an emergency expedient, but of lasting normative architecture, always subject to strict legality, proportionality, jurisdictional control and continuous review by indicators public.



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The thesis is that this permanent arrangement, when operating with clear and general rules for cases of organized macrocrime, functions as a legal technology of organizational incapacitation, focusing on decisive points (command, finance, logistics and communication) without affecting the core of fundamental rights. Instead of automatic expirations, a surveillance model is adopted regulatory: periodic audits, course corrections and accountability, preserving stability of the subsystem and avoiding the normalization of arbitrary actions.

The overall objective is to demonstrate the normative viability and strategic convenience of this dualism criminal: citizen criminal law and enemy criminal law acting in a complementary manner. As specific objectives, the text: (i) presents the theoretical-legal basis of Enemy Criminal Law; (ii) describes Brazilian reality at its intersection with factions; (iii) analyzes incentives and awareness of agents; (iv) compares Latin American paradigms; and (v) proposes an institutional design permanent, with metrics and counterweights.

The methodology combines legal-dogmatic analysis, comparison with Latin American experiences, Americans. The argumentative path goes from the theoretical framework to the national diagnosis, passing through compared lessons and culminates in a proposal for permanent implementation.

The originality lies in reviewing the principles of contemporary penalism and affirming, without subterfuge, a permanent, auditable enemy criminal law aimed at preserving sovereignty and the material legal order. This presupposes new ideological and civilizational bases — including the constitutional reformulation and the theory of criminal law itself — to establish a stable regime, with governance between the Union, States and Municipalities, performance contracts and public disclosure periodic review of results. More than 'toughening up', it's about reordering incentives: making them more expensive structurally belonging to factions and making cooperation with legality cheaper, even if this demand a review of the limits currently inscribed in the Charter and in the guarantee dogma.

Theoretical framework — Jakobs inside the model

Günther Jakobs's starting point is functional: criminal law serves, first and foremost, to maintain to uphold the validity of the rules, that is, to sustain social confidence that the rules are valid and will continue to be valid. As long as the individual recognizes himself as the recipient of these rules and, in terms general, offers the “cognitive guarantee” of behavior in accordance with the Law, it is treated as citizen; in this context, the penalty looks back, falls on accomplished facts, obeys due process in its entirety and reaffirms the violated norm. The picture changes when the conduct ceases to be episodic and becomes a project of corrosion of the legal order: the action becomes programmatic, stable, organized, aimed at maintaining and expanding the offensive against the system of norms itself. There the figure of the enemy emerges — not as dehumanization, but as a legal diagnosis of who



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broke the minimum pact of citizenship and is part of a structure that intends to replace the order in force by another (Manuel Cancio Melia, 2003).

From this theoretical core derives the justification for anticipation. For Jakobs, in the face of threats organized and lasting, criminal law cannot remain exclusively reactive, limited to punish after the damage. It allows for a qualified preventive protection, whose object is not the person in itself, but rather the capabilities that make the continuation of the attack possible: command, communication, finance, logistics, recruitment. Instead of waiting for the repeated consummation of harmful results, the system acts on these support points, neutralizing them. The displacement is clear: in the right In the criminal law of the citizen, the central question is “what did you do?”; in the criminal law of the enemy, the question relevant is “there is concrete proof that you integrate and maintain, at present, the collective capacity to continue to violate the validity of the Law?”

This design is only legitimate if the “enemy” is qualified by objective facts. Jakobs rejects labels. identity, territorial divisions or social stigmas. The incidence depends on demonstrations verifiable evidence of functional integration into a hostile organization, such as directing, financing, laundering assets, manage logistics, transmit orders, recruit, and discipline. The bridge with the classical critique of “criminal law” of the author” is precisely here: we do not punish “who someone is”, but what someone does to maintain foot a collective machine of denial of the Law. The emphasis, therefore, is structural and evidentiary, and not biographical.

To prevent anticipation from becoming arbitrary, Jakobs demands a legal belt: legality strict proportionality and adaptation—not suppression—of guarantees. The adversarial system can be deferred where prior notice would frustrate the legitimate purpose of the measure, but must always be reviewed in short deadlines, with dense motivation, delimitation of the object, complete chain of custody and auditable documentation. Interceptions, breaches of confidentiality and intrusive precautionary measures are only supported when anchored in independent evidence, precise scope and non-automatic renewal. The compatibility with a State of Law does not arise from the label “exceptionality”, but from the form how instruments are designed and controlled.

Jakobs's thesis also offers criteria for evaluating the model itself. If the target is capacity organizationally, success is not measured by repressive volume, but by signs of disarticulation: consistent decline in illicit communications originating from prison, blocking of new flow of resources, extension of the time needed to rebuild logistics, loss of intramural criminal governance and extramural areas, improving the elucidation of strategic crimes. In other words, prevention qualified needs to produce measurable effects on the nodes that support the organization, under penalty to be reduced to the rhetoric of hardening.

The recurring objections — selectivity, slippage to the author, normalization of the exception — can be addressed from Jakobs himself. Selectivity is avoided when the law closes the scope



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regime material in the proven organizational phenomenon, prohibiting any socio-territorial criteria.

The slippage to the author is prevented when the incidence depends on acts of integration objectively demonstrated, and not profiled. The permanent exception is set aside when the application is always individualized, temporally delimited and subject to periodic review based on public indicators of effectiveness and compliance. The model is not “less guarantee-based”; it is guarantor in another key: it shapes the guarantees to the demonstrated risk and protects them with controls external and metrics.

Transposed to our cut, the theoretical framework leads to an operative conclusion: the enemy, here, is the qualified faction, that is, the organization with a stable command structure (intramural/extramuros), persistent financial and logistical capacity, control of routes or markets illicit activities and effective communication between management and the base. The incidence of the subsystem depends on the decision motivated judicial action that demonstrates systemic risk, insufficient ordinary means and delimits the the scope and timing of each measure. The target is capabilities, not the indistinct mass of individuals; Proof is the axis, not suspicion; prevention is the method, not improvisation.

Finally, it is important to note the choice of institutional design that logically follows from Jakobs and that we adopted: a permanent subsystem in the law, coexisting with the citizen's criminal law.

Permanent does not mean without brakes; it means stable in terms of rules and surgical in activation. Normative predictability avoids the succession of “crisis” improvisations, while requiring documentation, auditing, and closure of measures when the need is exhausted. This is balance — skilled prevention, focus on capabilities, robust evidence, effective controls and metrics public — which transforms Jakobs’ thesis into a theoretical framework capable of guiding, in a compatible with the Constitution, the penal policy directed at organizations that deny in a systematically enforce the Law.

Brazilian reality and criminal factions — why the threat demands the enemy's criminal law

Brazilian organized crime has long ceased to be a mere sum of individual crimes. In large centers, border routes and logistical axes, factions built something different: a parallel order with command, discipline, cash, internal courts and the ability to impose conduct on third parties. This order does not “coexist” with that of the State; it replaces it, where it can, and conditions it, where it cannot. When a faction sets curfews, collects taxes, adjudicates disputes, regulates markets, and guides public officials through corruption or threats, it not only offends dispersed legal interests: it attacks the validity of the law. This is precisely the cutoff point proposed by Jakobs. While the delinquent citizen recognizes – even if he breaks – the validity of the norm, the organization denies the pact, presents itself as a competing authority and destroys the trust that allows common life under rules



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general. Therefore, the answer cannot be an extension of common criminal law; it must be law penal of the enemy, aimed at neutralizing the collective capacity to continue governing (ALVES, 2024).

The Brazilian experience confirms, step by step, this erosion. The prison system has become, in several states, in a command center: from there orders are sent, conflicts are arbitrated, prices are defined and routes, losses are recovered (SILVA, 2023). In the territory, the faction modulates violence according to your interest: it increases homicides when competing for market share and reduces them when it reaches a monopoly coercive, maintaining obedience at low cost. Around this mechanism, systematic extortion of commerce, transport control, “authorization” of works, debt management, forced recruitment and intimidation of authorities build a parallel jurisdiction (BIDERMAN, 2019). Those who live under this power learn, by instinct, that the rule that “applies” is that of the faction, not that of the Penal Code. It is this – the functional replacement of the state norm – that characterizes the enemy in Jakobs's key. These parallel states already dominate 26% of the Brazilian population, according to research by a team from the University of Cambridge (URIBE, 2025), and are distributed in 64 factions around Brazil (GLOBO, 2025).

In this context, the limits of common criminal law become clear. The traditional model looks back, holds individuals responsible for past events, requires a long investigation period, full contradiction from the first act and a chain of guarantees designed for conflicts episodic. Against an organization that plans, delegates, replaces leaders, buys silence and rules from prison, this cadence not only loses effectiveness; it allows the attack to continue while the process drags on. The result is known: arrests of “small fish”, releases predictable, rapid recomposition of logistics, symbolic victory of the group that, in the end, demonstrates more stability than the State. Herein lies the dogmatic reason for the enemy's criminal law: when the object is the organized capacity to deny the validity of the Law, it is not enough to punish facts; it is I need to stop the machine from continuing to run.

The consequent application of this premise shifts the priority from “more of the same” to the simple and decisive: surround, isolate and neutralize the points that keep the faction alive – command, communication, cash and logistics – through clear, fast and massive measures, legally enabled to face organized hostility. It's not about inventing sophisticated solutions: it's about doing the obvious the prudence of the common model prevents the required pace. The logic is one of sovereignty: to preserve the national jurisdiction where it has been replaced by a de facto power. In practical terms, this means recognize the qualified faction as the target of the subsystem and authorize, by law, a permanent regime preventive action, with broad and rapid preventive arrests, communication bans intramural, immediate blocking of flows and legal occupation of territories under parallel command, all subject to jurisdiction and temporal delimitation in the specific case, but without the paralysis that arises



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to transplant, to the enemy, the integral liturgy of the citizen's criminal law.

The argument is not abstract. When El Salvador decided to surround the pandillas with clear phases and speed – starting with large-scale preventive arrests – what we saw was the translation

operational aspect of Jakobs' thesis: the attack is stopped before pursuing, one by one, its effects (GUERRA, 2024). There are legitimate costs and debates about that path, but the structural lesson is not

depends on copying every detail: when the State asserts its normative sovereignty, it prioritizes neutralization of parallel power and takes away the breath of command and recruitment, the enemy ceases to govern. Brazil, with its different dimensions and federation, needs its own design, but the

direction is the same: strong and simple prevention, with its own legal basis, instead of perpetuating “management of crisis” that only changes names in the leadership and preserves the machinery.

This framework also explains the appropriate metrics. If the purpose is to restore the validity of the

Right, the indicators of success are not “number of operations” or “tons seized”, but

signs of loss of government by the enemy: abrupt and sustained drop in illicit communications coming from prison, increased time to rebuild logistics after enclosures, blocking of new flow of

resources (and not just confiscation of old stock), collapse of internal courts and simultaneous reduction of homicides and extortion in previously controlled areas (GÓMEZ-QUINTERO, 2023. GARCÍA-PONCE,

2024). At the same time, state capacity must appear in the series of speed of decisions of neutralization (when the State requests measures to interrupt the faction's power, arrests

preventive measures, blocking of communications in prison, freezing of values, the median time

between the request and the decision has to fall a lot), in the low rate of revocations due to useless formalism (the actions cannot depend on exaggerated bureaucracy and formalities that nullify police action and

all its fruits for the neutralization of criminal factions) and in the reduction of victimization of

residents who lived under a parallel government (the indicators that the population feels on their skin, for example, extortion “tax”, threats to traders, disappearances, targeted killings,

“curfew” must be dropped clearly and consistently. If the resident continues to pay

“toll” and being coerced, the State did not resume jurisdiction, even though it made great operations. If these numbers don't move, there is no victory; there is rhetoric.

To understand the threat to the order clearly, it is useful to describe it grammatically.

The faction, as an enemy, displays: its own normativity (internal rules, sanctions, parallel “justice”),

de facto jurisdiction (ability to impose conduct and resolve conflicts), administration (cash, logistics, discipline), strength (ability to coerce and kill according to interest), stable communication between

dome and base, including from the prison. Each of these elements is a direct denial of the Law

state. Therefore, what justifies the subsystem is not a “hard” bet for pleasure; it is the coherence

dogmatic with the idea that whoever breaks the pact and institutes a different order cannot receive the

the very same treatment that preserves, by design, the slowness that the enemy exploits. None of this requires

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abandon the Constitution; it demands putting everything in its place. The criminal law of the citizen follows integral to the mass of common conflicts. For qualified factions, the criminal law of enemy, permanent in law and surgical in the case, with swift and broad preventive arrests when there is a demonstration of structure and systemic risk, effective communicational containment in prison, immediate blocking of resources, fencing off areas of command and quick trials in courts with competence defined for the phenomenon. What changes is the order of things: first, neutralize, then processes as appropriate; first, it regains jurisdiction in the territories, then normalizes the routine. Without this inversion – simple in formulation, decisive in effect – we will continue to confuse management statistics with restoration of the Law.

The Brazilian reality does not call for sophisticated inventions; it calls for legal courage to take on, with Jakobs, that organizations that deny the validity of the Law are enemies and should be treated as such, with speed, scale and simplicity, under judicial control that ensures delimitation and responsibility, but without paralyzing the assertion of sovereignty. If the State surrounds, isolates, and neutralizes clearly – and if you measure the restoration of your own authority by indicators of loss of government of the faction – normality returns to make sense. Otherwise, we will continue to manage the conflict with the grammar that the enemy learned to win.

Incentives and Awareness of Agents

Proposing Enemy Criminal Law (DPi) as a new paradigm requires understanding, with precision, why individuals join, remain in, and rise in criminal factions; why, even under high risk, continue to operate; and what would actually make them leave. In other words, the legal intervention will only be efficient if it structurally alters the incentives that shape conduct of the agents and affect the forms of consciousness — rational, identity and moral — that legitimize belonging. In this section, the analysis combines lenses from rational choice, sociology of organizations and moral psychology to build a framework that directly engages with the design of the compatible DPi proposed at the end of the article.

In terms of rational choice, the agent evaluates the expected return of belonging to the faction in light of alternatives outside of crime. The decision, far from being purely “economic,” brings benefits immediate (income, weapons, protection) to symbolic benefits (status, belonging) and deferred costs (risk of death, imprisonment, stigmas) discounted over typically short time horizons. In territories where the state is intermittent and legal markets are precarious, the faction offers a very short-term earnings curve, with low entry barriers, insurance mechanisms (the “group protection”) and internal mobility routes. In this balance, what criminal policy traditional has done — increasing penalties and intensifying non-targeted operations — tends to increase



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diffuse costs without touching the nodes that sustain the gains: the chains of command, communication and financing. The result is a perverse balance: the more low-strategic-value prisons, faster replacement and cheaper recruitment (BEAUDRY-CYR, 2015).

Permanence in the faction, in turn, is explained by the combination of positive incentives (income stable, protection of family members, internal “career”) and negative incentives (severe sanctions for desertion, debts, exposure of relatives). The organization reduces member uncertainty by providing operational predictability, rapid internal “justice” and a repertoire of norms that make everyday life legible — while raising the costs of leaving: those who want to leave the group face a diagonal of material and symbolic risks that make giving up economically irrational in the short term. The agent's consciousness, therefore, becomes shaped by a normative universe in which faction replaces the State in providing order, and in which disloyalty is recoded as punishable immorality. The effect is cumulative: over time, the member's identity becomes confused with the role it plays in the group (SARAIVA, 2025; BRASIL PARALLELO, 2025. AMORIM, 2024).

The internal structure of the factions deepens this dynamic. There are classic agency problems: leaders need to control information, cash flow, discipline and violence, ensuring efficiency at the lowest possible cost. To do this, they create screening and promotion mechanisms that select more loyal agents and punish deviations in an exemplary manner, reducing the need for violence everyday life. When the group achieves the capacity to produce obedience at low cost, its governance is strong; when he has to kill a lot to maintain discipline, there are signs of fragility. This distinction is crucial for the DPi: measuring obedience and capacity is more relevant than counting arrests. Measures such as communication latency between management and base, logistical recovery time, flows “new” intercepted financial records and orders originating from prisons are worth more for the diagnosis than episodic overt operations.

Prison, in particular, requires non-intuitive reading. If viewed as a production environment—and not of neutralization — of criminal power, becomes a structural node of the criminal economy. Leadership with relatively free communication they optimize logistics, recruit and punish with greater predictability; affiliates therefore perceive that the group's protective capacity subsists even when heads are temporarily removed. The expected return of belonging, therefore, does not falls with imprisonment if the organization maintains intramural command. From the perspective of incentives, the conclusion is straightforward: penal policies that do not break down communication and command in prison increase the value of active “affiliate”, as they make prison a stage of stabilizing ties, not of disarticulation.

The dimension of consciousness — the way the agent thinks and justifies his conduct — is not accessory. The faction socializes its members through narratives of honor, community protection, and swift justice, offered as functional substitutes for citizenship. Hobsbawm portrays this imaginary in his book



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Bandits, Hobsbawm describes the *social bandit* as 'a peasant outlaw whom the lord and the state consider a criminal, but who remains within the society that surrounds him and is seen as a hero, champion and avenger—that is, an agent of 'poor man's justice' who operates by codes of honor and protection of the community (HOBSBAWM, 2012). This moral grammar favors neutralizations typical, reducing guilt and normalizing violence. Interventions that ignore this symbolic plane tend to widen the gap between the state and the peripheries. From the DPi's perspective, the answer is not just punitive: it is present and institutional. The State must continuously occupy territories with active and safe schools, regular public services, visible administrative order and projects of cultural assimilation that replaces the criminal imaginary with references of legal belonging. The incentives for organized crime combine material gains, status, and predictability. In the plan economic, the faction ensures immediate income, liquidity and a collective "cash" that amortizes losses individual — fees, family support, bail — so that the expected return exceeds that of legal alternatives available in vulnerable neighborhoods. Organizationally, it offers a "career path": hierarchies, rules of promotion, protection and recognition that give horizons to young people with little qualification. This structure only works because coordination is efficient: the latency between orders and execution is low, including from prison, which allows for punishing deviations, rerouting and replace frames quickly. In the territory, the faction occupies the state vacuum and operates as a practical authority: it regulates conflicts, imposes "fees," defines routines. By delivering a minimum order, it gains instrumental legitimacy and reduces everyday resistance. The symbolic dimension reinforces the bond: narratives of honor and "swift justice," rituals, affections and marks of belonging confer internal prestige and make leaving morally costly. The prison environment, when it allows communication and arbitration of conflicts, ceases to be disincentive and becomes career continuity, maintaining the power of command. There are also "structural" incentives. The legal-procedural incentive stems from the perception of low punishment. effective — slowness, nullities, weak evidence —, which reduces the expected cost of the activity. The fragmented corruption and collusion at checkpoints reduce operational friction. The channels laundering operations preserve and reactivate profits, ensuring financial breathing room. And the costs of desertion — debt, threats, stigma, lack of options — raise the barrier to exit. In border regions and porous logistics corridors, the replenishment of personnel, goods and routes is quick, closing the circle of incentives that sustains continued criminal activity. There is a fundamental care in this arrangement: not to convert the exception into the rule. A DPi guided by incentives are only legitimate if they operate under strict legality, defined temporality and proportionality strict, with deferred contradiction only when indispensable and always reviewable within short deadlines, under penalty of becoming the author's criminal law. Otherwise, instead of reducing the value of the asset "affiliate", the State increases the value of the asset "rebel", as it expands the advantages and



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externalities that the faction instrumentalizes.

In the end, the metric of success of this engineering of incentives and awareness cannot be exclusively punitive. What matters is whether the faction's critical nodes were dismantled with simultaneous reduction in lethality and victimization, if the rate of solving strategic crimes increased, whether there was a drop in illicit communications originating from prisons, whether the illicit assets recovered represent a blockage of new flow and not just old stock, and if the logistical recomposition is slower and more expensive. Such indicators, publicly displayed on an auditable dashboard, function as signal to all agents involved — from the police officer to the potential recruit — that the cost-benefit of organized crime has been reorganized. It is in this sense that the DPI, by focusing on capabilities and narratives, can be converted from simple rhetorical hardening into public policy constitutionalized, capable of aligning individual and collective incentives with the restoration of legitimate authority of the State.

Current Paradigms in Public Security and Criminal Law in Latin America — Lessons from El Salvador and compatibility scenarios in Brazil

The Latin American mosaic reveals very different responses to organized macrocrime, but a common lesson: when the State clearly defines who the organizational enemy is and acts with speed to neutralize command, communication, finance and logistics, the results appear; when hesitates, crime rebuilds capacities. The case that most impacts the debate is that of El Salvador, where the public authorities recognized the factional threat as a breach of the legal order and adopted a large-scale preventive siege, with extensive precautionary arrests, disruption of intramural command and daily control of the territory (AP NEWS, 2024; HARVARD REVISTA DRCLAS, 2025. ROSEN, 2022). The accelerated decline in violent indicators there did not result from episodic operations, but a political decision to place the preservation of sovereignty above a set of guarantees procedural measures incompatible with the pace of an internal war; this arrangement, however, requires a basis regulations that support it, under penalty of relying only on government will. Alongside this model, experiences like Colombia's have shown more gradual gains anchored in reforms procedural, intelligence and patrimonial interdiction, but also brought the risk of accommodation: armed groups were not extinguished, and some of them moved into the political sphere — an unviable solution for Brazilian factions whose actions are openly anti-legal. Mexico illustrates the limits of prolonged militarization without a robust chain of evidence and without a prison that truly breaks command: the presence of troops replaced, for years, the civil institutional weakness, produced fragmentations violent and did little to reorganize incentives. In contrast, procedural reforms in Chile and in other sectors from Argentina increased the speed and quality of evidence, supporting greater accountability

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stable, but without touching the decisive point of countries with territorial governance crimes: prison as command platform. Recent episodes in Peru, Ecuador, and Paraguay, with rebellions and attacks coordinated from prisons, only reinforce that, without an auditable communication breakdown and risk management, every “hardened” policy falls apart from within. Faced with this situation, Brazil needs face two scenarios honestly: the first, of compatibility with the Constitution of 1988, which allows a different regime for organizations that deny the validity of the Law — with swift judicial decision, adversarial proceedings deferred within strict deadlines, effective rupture of the prison government and subsequent institutional occupation of the territories —, and a second, more frank, reform constitutional (or even constituent assembly) that unambiguously enshrines a right permanent enemy penal for qualified factions, with national activation standards, review and closure. In both paths, the comparative synthesis is the same: the paradigm that works combines legal definition of the enemy, preventive and rapid neutralization of the core capabilities and, then, dense and continuous state presence — school, services, administrative order and assimilation cultural — to empty the criminal imagination. Without this, showy operations multiply, but the structure of crime remains; with this, there is a real chance of closing down organizations and restoring jurisdiction of the State where it was lost.

Proposal for a new paradigm for Brazil — prevention, neutralization and a few well-established measures founded

Jakobs's reading starts from a simple intuition: criminal law serves to maintain the validity of norms; when an organized group begins to deny this validity and replace it with an order parallel, there is no longer a “citizen” in the criminal sense, there is an enemy. With the enemy, the method is not manage crises nor punish retrospectively: it is to act preventively to prevent continuity of the attack, neutralizing the capabilities that make it possible — command, communications, finance and logistics. This requires reordering the process: certain guarantees typical of the citizen's criminal law (such as the absolutely immediate contradiction) cannot block the preventive purpose when there is evidence of stable integration into an organization that governs against the law. The recent example of El Salvador demonstrated the effectiveness of this logic: the legal ground was prepared, the enemy was surrounded and his power of command was quickly interrupted.

Transposed to Brazil, the first step is to legally recognize the faction classified as an enemy for criminal purposes. This is not a political label, but a legal act with closed criteria: stable command structure, persistent financial and logistical capacity, territorial governance or prison and operational communication between leadership and base. This recognition — given by an agency competent judicial authority, with dense motivation and standardized proof of acts of integration such as management,



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financing, laundering, logistics management, order transmission and recruitment — provides the trigger

for a specific procedural regime. Without this framework, everything else becomes a mere one-off operation, vulnerable to the rapid recomposition of the criminal machine.

Once the enemy has been defined, neutralization must occur before the ordinary process, designed to episodic conflicts, drag on until they become ineffective. This is where block preventive detentions come in, always individualized by decision, but executed simultaneously and quickly, with contradiction deferred: first the measure to stop the attack is carried out; then, in a short period of time and right, the defense is heard and the judge reevaluates. This engineering does not suppress defense; it only displaces the moment of participation so that the preventive purpose is not frustrated. What gives substance to the provision is not the number of warrants, but rather the evidentiary basis: instructed nominative lists by objective acts of integration, not by generic suspicions. Subsequent screening keeps in regime the command, finance, logistics and communication centers, and releases — with measures alternatives — peripheral cases without sufficient evidence, reducing errors and focusing the response in who keeps the machine standing.

At the same time, prison ceases to be a platform for government and returns to being a place of custody. To this end, it is essential to break the intramural command through effective and auditable technological blocking of signals in critical units, functional segregation of leadership (without spaces for deliberation joint) and clear protocols for visiting and speaking sessions. Access to the defense remains assured, but the logistics routine — times, frequencies, records — ceases to be a disguised command channel.

This is, once again, Jakobs' logic: if the aim is to prevent the continuation of the attack, the vein is cut. where the enemy rules. El Salvador illustrates this point well: without taking the breath away from communication of the gangs, no siege would have been maintained.

The third front, which is imposed as a direct consequence of the imprisonment of leaders and cadres operational, is the institutional entry of the State into the territory with its permanent apparatus and a deliberate process of cultural assimilation that undoes the criminal imaginary. With the chain of neutralized command, the State must occupy the symbolic and practical space previously dominated by faction: full-time schools with a curriculum focused on discipline, work and civic belonging; predictable and visible public services (health, assistance, conflict mediation) operating all days; rites and references of local pride anchored in legality (sports, art, civic celebrations); administrative routines that replace informal “swift justice” with accessible institutional channels.

This continuous, recognizable and hierarchical presence reorganizes expectations, consolidates authority legitimates and reorients aspirations, removing from the community the grammar of honor and factional protection and filling it with signs of citizenship and order under the law. Without this dense state occupation — which comes after the penal siege and stabilizes it —, the narrative void tends to be colonized again by crime.

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These three measures — legal recognition of the enemy, swift preventive arrests with deferred contradiction and rupture of communicational command with immediate prohibition of flows — are sufficient to faithfully translate Jakobs's thesis into Brazilian practice. They can be enshrined in federal law, with safeguards compatible with the Constitution: closed definition of organizational target; motivated court decision as trigger; peremptory review deadlines; documentation, logs and chain of custody for all techniques; summary redress to good third parties faith; and specialized courts to give way to decisions and avoid delays that undo the effect preventive. If, even so, the 1988 framework does not support the required scale and speed, there is two transparent political paths: constitutional amendment that creates a material regime of confrontation with structured criminal organizations (constitutionalizing deferred contradiction in strict cases, specific deadlines for preventive measures, blocking of communications and jurisdiction specialized), or, at the limit of ambition, convening a constituent assembly to reorder, in neutralization phase, the primacy between sovereignty and procedural guarantees, always preserving the human dignity and access to defense as material limits. The difference between the paths is not in the spirit — qualified prevention —, but in how much it is intended to shield the method against invalidations in constitutionality control.

The success criterion, in turn, needs to be consistent with the object: it is not important to count operations or isolated seizures, but rather to verify whether the validity of the Law has been restored. The signs are unequivocal when the strategy works: abrupt and sustained decline in illicit communications originating from prison; increased time needed to rebuild logistics after enclosures; effective blocking of new flow of resources; collapse of internal courts and systematic extortion; joint reduction of homicides and victimization in previously dominated areas; and speed of decision-making with low rate of revocations due to formalism. If these indicators do not change, there is no prevention — there is only rhetoric.

In short, the new paradigm does not need an infinite catalog of ideas: it needs a few. measures, well-constructed and clearly executed. The enemy is recognized by objective criteria; neutralizes itself before the ordinary process loses the dispute; prevents the prison from governing; dries up if the money that feeds the machine. That's essentially what El Salvador did; that's what Jakobs authorizes when it states that, in the face of those who deny the validity of the Law, the function of criminal law is prevent the attack from continuing. The rest—including policies for reintegration and reconstruction of public services — comes later, when the State has already regained its jurisdiction and normality legal system has made sense again.

Taking El Salvador as a reference for the application of Enemy Criminal Law (DPi) in Brazil implies assuming, frankly, a shift from the guarantee axis to the primacy of sovereignty and prevention. The core of the proposal — legal recognition of the organizational enemy, arrests mass preventive measures with deferred contradiction, rupture of intramural command and occupation institutional of the territories — has the power to quickly break criminal capacities. But, precisely because it operates through shortcuts of speed and concentration of power, the model carries risks which, if underestimated, can erode its legitimacy, produce reverse effects and make its implementation unfeasible. continuity. Below, I discuss these risks as a “stress test” of the paradigm, already calibrated to new parameters.

The first risk is constitutional and institutional. A Salvadoran-style application puts clauses under strain. of the 1988 Constitution: due process, ordinary jurisdiction, presumption of innocence, and limits on pretrial detention. It is possible to build a compatible path by law and interpretation (strict deferred contradiction, peremptory review deadlines, motivation dense), but the ambition for speed on a large scale may require constitutional reform and, in a version maximalist, constituent debate. The danger here is not just legal: it is political. Without a normative basis clear, mass decisions can be reversed in a cascade, or worse, legitimize a culture of shortcuts permanent, in which any social emergency justifies successive compressions of guarantees. In terms of sustainability, a DPi that does not “pass” the Courts’ test will die by invalidation; a DPi that tries to “ignore them” will die of illegitimacy.

The second risk is the systemic error inherent in large-scale operations. By authorizing arrests simultaneous preventive measures, with deferred contradiction and compressed evidentiary window, the risk of false positives (peripheral people labeled as members) and false negatives (key frames that escape). In dense territories and flexible networks, the integration test can degenerate into fragile evidence, and subsequent screening, even if planned, may be slow to repair the damage. The effect aggregate is twofold: concrete injustice and symbolic capital for the factional narrative (“persecution collective”), precisely what the model aims to extinguish. The strength of the paradigm lies in its speed; its weakness, if poorly measured, is precipitation.

Connected to this, the prison risk arises. Neutralizing command in prison is a condition of possibility. of the DPi; however, incarcerating a lot and quickly in an overcrowded system, without functional segregation effective and auditable signal jamming technology, increases the capacity of intramural government. Disorganized prisons generate criminal power, not the other way around. The stress test here is simple: If, after the wave of arrests, the origin of orders from the units increases, politics has entered into mode self-destructive. Furthermore, degrading conditions, if persistent, expose the State to



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judicial and international accountability, fueling release decisions and eroding legitimacy

of the set.

There is also the displacement effect. El Salvador operated with a small territory, borders controllable and highly centralized decision-making. Brazil is vast, asymmetrical, and federative.

Intense enclosures in capitals and known axes tend to shift routes to porous borders, waterways and microregions with lower state density. Without the capacity to follow this movement — including interstate and international cooperation — the model can produce islands of apparent order surrounded by logistical recomposition corridors, which reduces their structural impact and creates political frustrations.

On the socio-political level, the Salvadoran reference is based on high domestic consensus and defeat clear symbolic representation of crime. In Brazil, federative plurality, litigiousness, and the fragmentation of elites can produce short cycles of support followed by judicial and political backlash. This opens the door for a risk of path dependence: once the exceptional machine is assembled, maintain

Their rotation becomes the cheapest way to demonstrate governmental "vigor," even when marginal effectiveness is already decreasing. This is how the exception becomes routine and, ultimately, loses potency.

Another sensitive point is the community impact. This article's proposal repositions the "third front." as institutional input of the State — schools, predictable services, administrative order and cultural assimilation — as a consequence of incarceration and the breakdown of command. The risk is reverse the sequence in practice: arrest a lot and not occupy with institutional density. The void narrative tends to be recolonized by crime; and, in the short term, substitute markets may emerge (diffuse extortion, micro-militias) in the name of "protection". The criminal victory, without daily civil presence, evaporates.

In the legal-procedural field, there is an engineering risk: the deferred contradiction, thought of as protective measure of preventive purpose, can slip into contradiction suppressed by habit.

Review deadlines based on rhetoric of urgency, stereotypical motivations, and renewals automatic processes create litigation that, when accumulated, undermines the credibility of the whole. The paradigm, then, it would find itself between two fires: either it is contained by the Courts, or it becomes a permanent foreign body in the legal system.

Finally, there is the international risk. The Inter-American System, although it does not impose a model unique, rejects extensive preventive detentions without prompt review, vague defense restrictions and conditions degrading. A policy that does not calculate this variable will produce convictions, compensation and, above all, internal institutional noise (judges and prosecutors react preventively), reducing the traction of the model within the country.

The sum of these risks does not discredit the paradigm; it delimits the space in which it can be effective and durable. The Salvadoran reference suggests that speed and centralization can bring down rates of



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violence in the short term. The Brazilian case raises other questions: can the prison system, from day one, neutralize factions and not produce it? Is there sufficient normative basis — or built — to support mass preventive detentions with effective and swift review? The State has the capacity to occupy the territories, daily, with school, health, assistance and order administrative, to dissolve the criminal imagination? Will there be institutional antibodies to contain corruption and technological opacity with the same firmness with which it surrounds the enemy?

If the answer to these questions is no, the risk is not only of “punitive overkill,” but of strategic ineffectiveness: too much is imprisoned, too little is dismantled and, once the initial impetus has passed, organization rebuilds finances, logistics, and narrative. If it is positive—and the numbers show sustained decline in illicit communications from prison, increased recovery time logistics, blocking new resource flows and real relief from victimization in previously dominated areas — then the DPI, even demanding profound reforms (including constitutional ones), will have found in the Brazil its environment of validity: a space in which sovereignty is asserted without being divorced from responsibility, and in which the exception ceases to be improvisation and becomes a clear, effective and finite rule.

Material and Method

The preparation of this article was based on qualitative research of a legal-dogmatic nature and comparative, with the objective of analyzing the Criminal Law of the Enemy (DPI) as an applicable paradigm to combat organized macrocrime in Brazil. The method employed was deductive, starting the theoretical foundations of Günther Jakobs and the concept of the enemy as an agent that breaks with the validity of the legal system, until reaching the normative and institutional proposition of a permanent penal subsystem.

Primary sources were examined, such as the Federal Constitution of 1988, criminal laws and decisions of the Supreme Federal Court related to public safety and fundamental rights, in addition from secondary sources, composed of classical doctrinal works (Jakobs, Zaffaroni, Ferrajoli) and empirical studies on Latin American experiences in combating organized crime, notably the Salvadoran model of combating gangs and Colombia's penal reforms, Mexico and Chile.

The analysis followed a comparative and analytical method, aimed at identifying principles, results and risks of each experiment. Supplementary data collection included official indicators of violence, incarceration and criminal recidivism available in public reports and databases government statistics. The integration of theory and practice allowed us to evaluate the viability of a penal subsystem of the compatible enemy — or reformer — of the Brazilian Constitution, considering its limits, potential and ethical-legal implications.



Results, Discussion, and Final Considerations

The path developed showed that the factional phenomenon in Brazil is not an episodic deviation, but a power structure that disputes, in practical terms, the jurisdiction of the State. In light of Jakobs, this allows for a different framework: when the threat is programmatic, organized and repeated, the criminal response cannot be limited to retribution for past events; it must operate in anticipation and neutralization of capabilities — command, communications, finance, and logistics — to prevent the parallel order is consolidated.

In this sense, the adoption of the Enemy Criminal Law (DPi) is not synonymous with “toughening up” rhetorical”, but rather a clear, objective and stable normative arrangement, aimed at the collective actor who denies the validity of the Law. Regional experience suggests that swift measures of siege, isolation of leadership and large-scale preventive arrests, when legally supported, can produce functional collapse of the factions. But success is not measured by flashy operations: it is measured by loss sustained criminal rule over people and territories, interruption of financial flows and inability to issue orders from prison.

At the same time — and this is a decisive point — the DPi does not replace the citizen's criminal law; it complements it. Dualism is a condition of legitimacy and effectiveness. Common criminal law preserves the core of guarantees, judges individual facts, stabilizes institutional routines and prevents the State from get used to the exception. The DPi, in turn, focuses on the hostile organization, with prevention techniques and neutralization proportional to systemic risk. One does not exclude the other: the coexistence of both is the mechanism that simultaneously keeps guarantees where they are due and prevents them from being the same guarantees are used to paralyze the fight against the enemy.

This complementarity also establishes boundaries. The DPi is responsible for defined targets, means, and deadlines; common criminal law is responsible for detailed evidence, full adversarial proceedings and procedural routines that sustains public trust. Where there is doubt about authorship and materiality, the regime prevails of the citizen; where there is a demonstration of structure, command and systemic risk, it is authorized to reinforced intervention, with swift judicial review and accountability for excesses. This avoids both the erosion of rights and the capture of the State by a repressive “anything goes”.

Finally, victory is only consolidated when penal neutralization is followed by the institutional presence of State — school, health, work, urban planning, culture — reoccupying the space that the factions have become a source of cheap obedience. The ultimate metric of the paradigm is not how many arrests were carried out, but if state jurisdiction returned to the places, if the time for logistical recovery increased, if the new flow of illicit money dried up, and if lethality and victimization fell together.

In summary: it is possible and necessary to establish, in Brazil, a DPi compatible with a State that

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intended to last. But it only makes sense as a subsystem that works alongside criminal law.

citizen. Complementarity — not exclusion — is what preserves guarantees where they protect

the innocent and prevents these guarantees from becoming a shield for those who intend to destroy the

validity of the Law. This is the combination that reconciles sovereignty with freedom, authority with

control, and security with Constitution.

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