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The Greek *psyche* to *Dasein*: genealogy of a non-egoic psychology

From the Greek psyché to Dasein: a genealogy of a non-egoic psychology

From the Greek psyche to Dasein: genealogy of a non-egoic psychology

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SUMMARY

The aim of this article is to evidence the discursive orders that made possible the emergence of psychology, understood as a field of knowledge divided into two epistemologically subordinate positions: Cartesian metaphysics and hermeneutic phenomenology. The purpose is to show how different historically constituted understandings revealed their contradictions and conditions of possibility. *The course begins with the* Greek psyche, conceived as an exteriority in motion, which medieval Christianity transforms into an interiority dominated by sinful desire. This turn leads to a Cartesian tension between body and soul, which Kant suggests can be problematized in terms of the conditions of possibility of consciousness. This epistemic dislocation opens space for Husserl to reinscribe the ego cogitans, overcoming substantialist dualism for the phenomenological epoch and disposing of consciousness as intentionality. The itinerary culminates in Heidegger, who dislocates or focuses intentional consciousness for the concrete existence of being-not-world. Contemporary contributions of clinical hermeneutics, such as those of Roberto Novaes de Sá, evidence that psychology can constitute not only as a natural science of the substantialized soul, but also as a discipline oriented to phenomenological care, capable of articulating existential understanding, clinical practice and ethical responsibility. With this horizon, it becomes possible to think of a non-egoic psychology, based on situated and relational existence, amidst the permanent tensions between metaphysical and phenomenological orientations that mark the Psi Field.

Keywords: Psychology; Epistemology; Discursive orders; Conditions of possibilities.

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of psychology did not follow from a linear evolution of thought, more than one process gone through breakdowns, disputes and tensions. Its constitution as an autonomous discipline philosophy inscribed itself in a field marked by epistemological antagonisms that still exist today reverberated in clinical practice, research and theoretical production. Among these tensions, o struggle between two great orientations: Cartesian metaphysics, which instituted a radical dualism between subject and object, and hermeneutic phenomenology, which seeks to restore original correlation between consciousness and the living world.

More than abstract oppositions, these orientations carry concrete implications on o mode as they are understood to consciousness, to experience and human existence. From yours modern primordials, to psychology is found no crossover of various fields do know that disputam or the right to tell the truth about the human soul (*psyche*). Reflect on the fundamentals epistemological approaches to psychology, however, do not mean just revisiting classical authors, anymore understand how their contributions constituted and constitute their own psychological discourse.



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It is this horizon that the present article is inscribed on. A historical analysis is proposed here-epistemological of the emergence of psychology, having as a fixed driver or mode as relationships between different historically constituted understandings revealed their contradictions, opened perspectives and outlined possibilities.

The central argument is that, embora to psychology is constituted from the metaphysical tension operationalized by Descartes and radicalized by the natural sciences, it finds in Kant and, later, in Husserl, ways to think differently: not as science of the soul substantiated, more as an investigation of the phenomenal field of experience.

The course was developed into four articulated moments: (1) the references epistemological issues that delimit psychology's field of possibility; (2) the conception of *psykhé* from the Homeric world to medieval Christianity, marked by the passage of the exteriority of the action for to moral interiority impregnated with desire; (3) the modern subject in Descartes and Kant, with a radicalization of dualism and criticism to metaphysics; and (4) Husserl, Heidegger and Daseinsanalyse, as horizon of phenomenological and ontological refounding of psychology.

1. EPISTEMOLOGICAL REFERENCES

Given the complexity and ambiguity of the central theme of this article, it becomes necessary to state the senses (meaning and direction) attributed to certain key topics of this document, such as epistemology, *psi* field, metaphysics and phenomenology. Sem pretend to drain either matter, or objective is to outline the boundaries of each question, so as to confer greater textual coherence and, thus, facilitate reader understanding, given the breadth, breadth and complexity of this effort synthetic demands.

Meanwhile, no matter what, it is precise to be quite cautious, lest you reduce, conceitually and em few paragraphs, or whatever or Cartesian thought ea phenomenology seems to be uma tarefa bold too, not to say impossible! I told, I acknowledge that, for the scope and circumscription at this point, some preliminary considerations are possible, at least in terms of delimitation gerais e of most decisive contrasts.

In this sense, we begin our search with the presentation of the notion of epistemology, accordingly defended by Amarante (2011), as a set of questions located outside the field theoretical-conceptual, which respects the production of knowledge that grounds, guides and inaugurate some knowledge/doing. This means, however, that everything to the production of knowledge human, even when not explicit, will be constituted by a philosophical substratum-epistemological that he defines irrevocably and unequivocally. This conceit assumes centrality



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when it is intended to know, distinctively, the bases of a given field of knowledge, em particular or psi field.

Com isso, it will still be precise to characterize that or that purporting to explicit as psi field refers to the field formed by the intersections between the different approaches to psychology concerned science, knowledge, told, will form a unit of things, but also a common field from which it parts different lines of dispersion.

It is not possible to treat here the distinctive particularities of each approach, nor list them nominally; my intuition is to point to a basic epistemological line that can situate tais divergences or dispersions from which we shall here pass on to consider as basic sciences metaphysics and sciences of phenomenological orientation.

According to Critelli (1996, p. 7.), one of the difficulties of explicit form concise or whatever it is to phenomenology resides in the fact of not being born as a method (embora also or be), or as a set of prescriptions of procedures and instruments (such as as modern sciences suppose), but more as “a critique of the methodology of knowledge scientist who rejects from the realm of real and own knowledge everything that cannot be subordinated to its narrow notion of truth, cognizant subject and cognoscival object”. The basic question of this discussion is the interest in knowing and delimiting, among others, the best path, the most appropriate angle and the most plausible way to capture and express, truly, what they are and how things are. [...] Addressing this problematic for phenomenology suggests that placement at dinner, inescapably, of a point of tension for traditional discourse metaphysical relative to consciousness: the problem of perspective. Point of tension, because to question gives perspective not consciousness necessarily invokes the provisional, mutable and relative character it gives truth, which the exercise of metaphysical thought presupposes that truth is one, stable and absolute, bem as to via accessing it. [...] It is not, however, about proving what error is in perspective metaphysics, but to demonstrate what unique and absolute it is not. It's about a breakthrough metaphysical retification, of a transcendence of the equivocal as to sovereignty of its perspective. (CRITELLI,1996, pp. 11-12).

In this sense, it becomes fundamental to explain what phenomenology understands by phenomenon. As Zahavi (2019, p. 13) explains, it is precise to understand the phenomenon not as mere subjective appearance that would conceal an underlying reality, but as the mode of appearance do own object. Or phenomenon is that which shows itself, or manifests itself, or knows itself reveals. A phenomenology can be conceived, however, as a two-dimensional philosophical analysis modes of appearance and, in articulation with this, as a reflexive investigation of the structures comprehensive that allow objects to be shown as or what they are. Consequently, a

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phenomenology categorically rejects what could be called the doctrine of two worlds: to differentiation between a world such as appears to us and a world such as it is in itself.

The complexity of phenomenology, however, lies precisely in the understanding that, besides being a philosophy of critical basis, it is, concomitantly, a method. This shape, Critelli (1996) teaches us that a second complexity is the delimitation of phenomenology regarding method, pois inscreve-se fundamentally in the discussão about to really, once that, for as metaphysical sciences in general, in fact reside in foresight, prediction and do not control two objects. In this sense, they are not concerned with understanding two phenomena by themselves facticity, but consider, and only, the theoretical structures conceived as method representational used to explain or object observed. Likewise, I raised a model universal representational, an object described from if and independently of its relation to or world can acquire dysfunctional, pathological and abnormal characteristics for those objects which is shown for two typically established patterns.

For as sciences of metaphysical orientation, however, every object of study, among them a humanity, has a prior nature, an a priori constitution and independent of any relation com or the world. Objects are described as closed, encapsulated structures or mechanisms em if ourselves, and can be understood in this way. Any alteration of this a priori is considered an error, a deviation to be corrected or discarded as unfeasible.

In contrast to these metaphysical positions, phenomenology sustains that every phenomenon, every appearance of an object, always presents an appearance of something for someone. As he argues Zahavi (2019, p. 18), case you want to understand how objects can appear as aquilo that they, with the meaning they have, are precisely necessarily taken into account or subject for or qual them appear. A phenomenology thinks beyond the subject-object dichotomy, investigating the nexus between the world and subjectivity. The world is not something merely subsistent in itself; ele aparece, of the structure of its appearance is conditioned by the subject, which can only be understood in its relation com or the world. As Merleau-Ponty asserts, the world is indissoluble from the subject, just as the subject is it is indissoluble from the world (ZAHAVI, 2019, p. 21).

It is on this horizon that Heidegger proposes, in his work Being and Time, an existential analysis do human entity as being-there by meio of its fundamental ontology. Here, "being" is not one noun, but a verb. Existential analytics deals with two modes of being do the human entity em its phatic relation to the world, gives expression to being-not-world. In fundamental ontology, or being-there it is not an entity endowed with previously constituted properties, but rather pure *ecstasy*, an openness for the world. It is spoken here of an original ontological nothingness that, precisely because it is not one previous constitution, is launched in the direction of the world and, this world, passes into existence from

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naturalized incorporations of constitutive preconceptions of a given epochal period. Assim, us modes of being are possibilities for being-there in the world and not prior determinations, immutable and you will not transpose.

It will not be possible, I do not scope this work, to move forward on these fundamental issues session. As I have already explained, far from draining or assumption, this introit served hardly as um initially, with the aim of outlining the most obvious boundaries and distinctions between a phenomenology of Cartesian metaphysics.

In the next section, however, I will present the importance of psyche for Homeric Greece and for medieval Christianity, it will be possible to move forward with a little more objectivity about it these correlations and distances.

2. FROM *PSYCHE* TO THE GREEK WORLD TO MEDIEVAL CHRISTIANITY

When we question the history of psychotherapies in general, we can perceive their origins commons date back to the pre-Roman Greek world and that, over the last 2,500 years, houve water relentless search for understanding the relationships between *psyche* (soul) and *soma* (body).

No Homeric period, for example, or corpo was seen as um agglomeration of limbs represented by the rhythm of its movements, bem as by the force of its musculature, by terms distinctive like *gyion*, *melea* and *others*. Neste historical period, or conceit of *psyche* was tido as a "sigh" or a divine breath that encouraged the inert body and, consequently, gave it life. At death, however, this soul leaves the body with a last sigh, before rumbling away realm of Hades, or underworld two mortals. This emphasis on rhythm and dynamics of body movement was crucial to this period da history, as we shall see below.

These definitions of body/soul, however, are very superficial and unclear enough about the importance of the question for the Greek world but not about its relevance for the emancipation of psychology in the eighteenth century or still on the researches that subsequently foram carried out by Heidegger, ao treat of originary ontological nothingness e by Foucault, to evidence in the hermeneutics of the subject that the dated and encapsulated notion of human nature inasmuch as interioritypreviously constitutive to be investigated is one historical construction marked by power relations.

In this sense, Vernant (2001, p. 215-218) helps us ao claim that the archaic Greeks e classics tinham an experience of the soul neither delimited nor unified, but more like a field open to multiple forces, oriented to the outside and not to the inside. Prosegue saying that this consciousness of whether it was projected and objectified or what the Greek effectively realized, or was,

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nas activities or works that he permitted his apprenticeship. This form, in relation of the subject to you even it is given by means of extroversion, not having questions about an original interiority to be first investigated and then launched into the world. What was in joke, however, was a mode as they linked to others and the world through their actions and, in this sense, experience gives soul that the Greeks maintained it was a kind of contact surface with exteriority.

This period, the interpretation of whether it is searching for truth were not necessarily subsumed to understanding two desires that carregavam internally, but sim to seek da truth on whether by means of the relationship they maintain with the form for which these desires were manifested in the action. What mattered most, however, was what they did, and not their desires; it wouldn't have reflective introspection; his experience was essentially existential. It had no, however, interior life, barely exterior. It is this relation to the fora that or if itself, or to the soul, was interpreted.

The author closes, explaining, in splendid formulation, the particular statute of the old man Greece, second or qual to awareness of whether it is the apprehension in if of an he, and not yet of an eu.

It is for example, in this context, the fact that, no Greek period in question, had (or did not foram found) narrative resources of a pessoal interiorityde own, as intimate jornaís or diaries that account for a particular intimacy. What we find are biographies and/or autobiographies as the story of oneself projected in relation to others from his work, or be, um I thinking em if how he and um I being seen by him.

Throughout Antiquity, a gradual construction of what we understand today is observed such as inner life, psychic life, intimacy and introspection. In Greek and Hellenistic cultures, a psyche still configures itself, largely and not hegemonically, as an instance exteriorizável: its sense was in the actions, social ties and projection of the subject onto the world, more than in an original interiority. To attention to intimate sphere, to inner life or to awareness of whether it remains subordinate to practical ethics and participation in the cosmos.

With the touch of Christianity, and most expressively in the medieval period, it the relationship between extroversion and introspection undergoes a radical and substantial transformation. The soul becomes conceived, decisively, as *the locus* of inner life and moral examination. It's ness context that inaugurates a profound hermeneutical shift: subjectivity ceases to be measured by observational actions or by external relations, concentrating on what happens in the âmago of the individual, in his most intimate thoughts, in his secret inquiries and full pulses of sin, well as in the temptations that mark his inwardness.

But once again, I turn to Vernant (2001) to explain the decisive role of Christianity medieval no nascimento deste novo humano, which now is defined and underlined fairly pela virtue of his most intimate thoughts, his secret inquiries, the pulses he takes from



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sin and by all the forms of temptation that take me account of your inner self. Here, the soul is conceived as an internal and introspective life.

With this, I want to emphasize that, in the experience of subjectivity as Greek exteriority, what mattered were the actions, not medieval Christianity, the actions are becoming more and more irrelevant, mattering preponderantly to the guidance that the wish passes to concern à consequence of these actions.

3. THE MODERN SUBJECT: FROM DESCARTES TO KANT

Ferreira (2004) proposed a central question for analyzing any event historical: this historical object would be the product of names mutations of an archetypal experience, configuring an origin, or the result of multiple chance and unexpected combinations, demarcating an irruption?

From this Foucauldian reflection, the historian or philosopher of consciousness is called recognize that historical interpretation is never neutral and requires conscious methodological choices. When applied to history of psychology — or better, of "psychologies," considering its diversity and epistemological dispersion — this reflection becomes even more necessary.

Or that, from this perspective, psi field chamo is, in fact, an arbitrary unit, constituted by a set of lines of thought that emerge from practices, knowledge and traditions diverse. To understand its rise, it is not enough to record its official inaugurations; é it is essential to investigate the institutional experiences and cultural practices that conditioned it its foundations. Nesse percouse, arises from the need to understand the historical conditions that allowed or referred field fosse gradually and hegemonically regulated fur know metaphysical and disciplined by an ideal of science.

It is in this context that the 17th century thought of René Descartes assumes a role decisive. Descartes, immersed in the scientific revolution and the consolidation of Newtonian physics, sought confer on the human soul a rationality comparable to the laws of nature. Learn epistemology rationalist inaugurated the idea of a modern subject, whose consciousness of the world — and of itself itself — could be systematically structured by reason and methodical duality. To metaphysics Cartesian sustained that to human *psyche* could be analyzed objectively, subordinating to soul to a universal and measurable causal model, aligning itself, thus, to logic and precision emerging natural sciences. To Cartesian rationality, however, constituiu the first step for to the conception of the modern subject as an autonomous agent, endowed with reflective and capable consciousness of thinking its own essence.



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Although both authors will be united by the Enlightenment spirit, Descartes is enrolled not rationalism, whereas Kant is situated not transcendental idealism. Otherwise, to hegemony Cartesian and Newtonian did not remain unanswered. Not in the 18th century, Kantian criticism arises, result of an epistemological crisis that affects European rationality: philosophy deixa de ask "or what is it something?" to inquire "how can we know something adequately?" Kant dislocates the focus of the object in if for the mode of consciousness, inaugurating a reconfiguration of relation between subject and object.

For the sake of criticism, the human race is understood not just as an instrument of inference, but also as a faculty capable of establishing the conditions of possibility do knowledge. In Kantian reflection he takes the Greek conceit of *arché*, interpreting-or as founding principle of knowledge, and redefines reason as the structuring principle that organizes a experience, rather than simply recording objective facts.

Consequently this reformulation is shallow for the psi field. Kant demonstrates that a soul cannot be treated as a natural object equivalent to an atom; it belongs to um distinct domain, characterized by phenomena governed by their own leis. Thus, according to Descartes still proposed measurement that controls the soul by methods analogous to physics, Kant introduced notion of epistemological boundaries: access to subjective interiority is mediated by categories cognitive and structural, which condition or consciousness without reducing it to mere physical objects. A Kantian criticism, however, inaugurates the possibility of a psychology as an autonomous discipline, oriented pela reflection on the subject and its modes of knowing, but still inserted no debate between metaphysics and science, between measurement and subjective experience.

To the emergence of the modern subject, this scenario hardly represents a change conceitual: it refers to an epochal event in which subjective interiority becomes the object of analysis, reflection and care. To hermeneutic historicity reveals that attributing to human soul head prior substantiality or essence involves disputing knowledge and powers that regulate what it is recognized as legitimate conheciment.

It is this field of tensions that are formed as epistemologies of the psi field: or equilibrium between the soul eo body becomes central, but the dispersion of two knowledges prevents the consolidation of uma epistemological unity.

In synthesis, Descartes and Kant configure fundamental frameworks of the modern subject: o first ao institute the possibility of a universal and methodically controllable rationality psyche, and secondly to problematize the limits of this consciousness and to highlight singularity of the subject as a condition of possibility of knowing.



4. HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER AND DASEIN ANALYSIS

The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries testified to the emergence of a reflection that seeks to dislocate or look at the modern Cartesian subject for an immediate experience of consciousness, retaking and reworking concepts that go back to classical Greece, porém reinterpreted by a singular historicity: a phenomenology.

Edmund Husserl, founder of this philosophical movement, inaugurates a perspective that understands consciousness not as a passive receptacle of information, but as an active field of intentionality, no qual every act of perception, thought or emotion is directed to a object.

The genesis of Husserlian phenomenology lies precisely in its radical opposition to psychologism — theoretical tendency which purports to ground logic and mathematics in empirical psychological processes. Husserl demonstrates that logical truths are ideas universal, not depending on contingent mental processes. Confusing logical laws with laws psychological is a fundamental categorical error. A phenomenology emerges, thus, as an alternative rigorous: instead of reducing ideal structures to psychological facts, it is proposed to describe these structures the essences of consciousness are not reduced to naturalized empirical processes.

This anti-psychologist orientation articulates directly with the reformulation that Husserl operates in Cartesian thought, no qual retake, of Descartes, to the demand of radical foundation of philosophy as a rigorous science and *ego cogito* as an apodictic starting point¹ I told, criticism decisively to "turn fatal" for which Descartes transforms the ego into *substantia cogitans* — a separate thinking substance, foundation of causal inferences about external reality. According to Husserl, Descartes "became the greatest of all discoveries — and realized same, in a certain way — sem, counted, catch or seu proper sense, portanto, or sense da transcendental subjectivity" (HUSSERL, 2013, p. 62). Thus, Descartes does not transpose to entry that leads to authentic transcendental philosophy.

The Husserlian reformulation replaced the Cartesian substantialist dualism of the *epoché* phenomenological — suspension of this natural which places us in front of the transcendental ego not as fragment of the world, more like an infinite field of pure experience. Or the title "*ego cogito*" should be extended: "everything and any *cogito* has in it, as long as it is a *visa*, or its *cogitatum*" (HUSSERL, 2013, p. 11). All consciousness is consciousness of something — structure of intentionality. A phenomenology

¹ Apodictic means something that is necessarily true, obvious and impossible to refute. It is a used term mainly in philosophy and logic to designate propositions or arguments whose validity is indisputable



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proposes, therefore, to investigate the co-originating correlation between intentional acts of consciousness and correlated objects that arise simultaneously and are mutually constituted.

In this context, Husserl does not limit himself to investigating the internal contents of the soul, but seeks more understand how these stories are presented in lived experience, in their entirety phenomenological. It is an epistemology oriented to direct experience, na qual or subject it is inseparable from the world it inhabits. A Husserlian phenomenology constitutes, thus, a break with or the Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm: instead of treating soul as an isolavel and measurable object, it it presents itself as a horizon of sense, whose constitution is intimately linked to relation between subject and world. This perspective inaugurates the possibility of thinking of psychology not just as natural science, but also as a discipline capable of grasping or lived, or singular eo intentional. A subjective interiority, then, ceases to be understood as prior substance and passes to be conceived as a field of relationships and meanings, no experience and consciousness can be articulated from dynamic manner.

Husserl's phenomenological reflection finds a crucial deepening in Martin Heidegger, his disciple, who dislocates or focuses intentional consciousness for concrete existence of being-not-world. Heidegger radicalizes the phenomenological project to demonstrate that the question gives subjectivity must be reformulated as it gives existence. Inspired by the hermeneutics of Wilhelm Dilthey — particularly for his emphasis on the constitutive historicity of human life —, Heidegger develops, in his seminal work *Being and Tempo*, an existential analytic that comprehends or *dasein* not as thinking substance enclosed in its interiority, but as being-not-world always already situated in a historical horizon.

No. § 31 of *Being and Tempo*, Heidegger articulates or conceit of understanding (*Verstehen*) as fundamental existential structure, not no sense of a cognitive faculty, but as a mode of being because qual or *Dasein* is its possibilities. Understanding is not an ability you possess, plus sim or mode as it exists. Not understanding resides, existentially, in the mode of being as power ser. *Dasein* is not a *subsistence* that, however, possesses the capacity to do something, but it is, primarily, being-possible (HEIDEGGER, 2012).

This understanding of *Dasein* as power-being is articulated through the structure of the project (*Entwurf*). The project is not a conscious blueprint or a mental representation of the future, but a existential structure for the qual or *Dasein*, or being-there, has always thrown itself into possibilities. Like clarifies Heidegger: "To project nothing has to do with behaving in relation to an ideated plane (...) but, like *Dasein*, he has always already projected himself and is projected as he is" (HEIDEGGER, 2012, p. 413). Or *being-there*, as it is, has already been understood and continues to be understood from possibilities historically situated.

The fundamental here is the articulation between project and facticity: Dasein is never part of the scratch, but it is always already launched (*geworfen*) into a historical world that bounds or horizon of its own possibilities. This condition of being-thrown did not constitute an external accident, but belonging essentially to his mode-of-being. As Heidegger observes: "As a matter of fact, the *dasein* already exists, each rather, its power-being in one of the possibilities of understanding" (HEIDEGGER, 2012, p. 415). As possibilities are, however, epochal — determined by the historical horizon in which they exist.

This emphasis on constitutive historicity, inspired by Dilthey, allows Heidegger demonstrate that to understanding of if cannot be modeled as introspective self-observation of a previously constituted interiority. On the contrary, "knowing oneself" is existential transparency — openness to all da structure being-not-world. As Heidegger formulates: "Or existing entity only 'becomes' itself.' comes to the extent that it becomes cooriginarily transparent in its being alongside the world, not being-com com the others, as constitutive moments of their existence" (HEIDEGGER, 2012, p. 417). The understanding of if, however, is not turned inward, but is existential hermeneutics — explanation of how we already always understand ourselves to exist situated in the world.

In this sense, understanding of the human entity is not primarily given by introspection or hair analysis of isolated atos gives awareness, but hair care (*Sorge*), understood as structure fundamental ontology of existence. O care reveals that o human being is always already involved in projects, relationships and contexts, being a continuous engagement with the world and com the others. Here, the concept of care is not restricted to an affective or therapeutic dimension, anymore it is presented as an ontological condition: it is in relation to the world, our modes of concern with something or someone, which constituted itself to its own structure of existence.

Phenomenology, however, proposes an ethics of being with and for the other, na qual a understanding of the *psyche* is given in the dialectic between interiority and exteriority, between experience subjective and shared world. In the realm of the psi field, this perspective provides a basis open that allows to situate the relationship between body and mind, action and experience, desire and responsibility, always in specific historical horizons.

Ao situate *psyche* not phenomenological context, Husserl and Heidegger retomam, by the way sophisticated, the old Greek question about the relationship between subject and object, but the adaptam aos problems of modernity and contemporary science. Differently from interiorization medieval introspective, which concentrates or focuses on sin, desire and inner life, a phenomenology dislocates or looks for or how the subject engages with the world, recognizing that any research on the human psyche must simultaneously consider the horizons of experience, the body and the social and historical contexts that make us exist.

In this scenario, psychology emerges not just as a science of the soul or of consciousness, anymore also as a discipline oriented to phenomenological care, capable of articulating analysis reflective, clinical practice and ethical understanding. Or care, nesse sense, turns out to be an exodus structure that connects theory and practice, thought and action, subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Thus, the phenomenology of care not only allows us to learn the content of experience, but also it also illuminates the ethical relationship between the therapist and the patient, between the researcher and the subject studied, emphasizing the need for presence, attention and responsiveness in the constitution of psychological consciousness.

By integrating Husserl and Heidegger, the psi field is perceived to acquire a dimension relational and ethical that transcends the Cartesian-Kantian dispute between measurement and introspection. A psyche is no longer conceived merely as an object of consciousness or as an inner substância, more as a phenomenon situated, experienced and lived, always in correlation with the body, the world eo another. This perspective lays the epistemological foundations for contemporary approaches, not only of clinical psychology and related psychotherapies, but also of some traditions psychoanalytics — such as relational psychoanalysis — especially those turned to relationality of clinical encounter, sensitive listening, ethical presence and attention to the dynamics of care between subject-world.

In sum, Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology inaugurates a new orientation for or the study of the *psyche*: consciousness is understood as intentional and correlative, or existence human as always already engaged in care and relationship with the world, situated on horizons historicals that epochally delimit its possibilities. The psi field, however, does not reduce to a naturalistic or metaphysical science, but it is also organized as a space of mediation between experience, reflection and ethical action. This phenomenological orientation to care allows articulation historicity, uniqueness and ethics, constituting a vital conduit connecting Greek traditions, medieval and modern do thinking about to soul eo corpo e fornece theoretical allowances for a contemporary understanding of the psychological subject as relational, bodily, historical e ethical.

4.1. OR CARE IN HEIDEGGER AND CLINICAL PRACTICE

The Heideggerian phenomenology of care and affectivity, to dislocate the understanding of human being from the metaphysical record gives substance for or existential record gives temporal openness, it was not limited to an abstract philosophical reflection. Its implications for the field of psychology clinical foram developed of systematic mode pela daseinsanálise, current clinical founded by



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Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss, which seeks to ground therapeutic and analytical practice existential Heideggerian.

But more recently, Alice Holzhey-Kunz² — Swiss philosopher and psychotherapist, straight disciple of Medard Boss and one of the main representatives of the second generation of *daseinsanálise* — tem published works, ministered seminars and participated in events in Brazil. She developed a head own methodology, within the phenomenological-existential tradition, inspired by Heidegger and em Freud. Despite its international relevance, its contribution is still not fully recognized in Brazil by the Brazilian Association of Health Care (ABD), the only institution authorized to conduct the training of *daseinsanalists* in our country.

In Brazil, stands out, among other researchers, or psychologist Roberto Novaes de Sá. Ao analysis of the relationship between affection and care from an analytical perspective, it is shown that structure the ontology of affective disposition constitutes privileged access to clinical understanding of existence. According to the author, "the affective disposition opens the being-there already launched in its there" (NOVAES DE SÁ, 2022, p. 18), so that every experience of psychic suffering should be understood not as dysfunction of an objective mental apparatus, but as a specific mode of finding-itself launched in existence.

This conception represents a radical break with the metaphysical presupposes that laid the foundation for the modern constitution of psychology. As far as Cartesian tradition compreendia or psychic suffering as a disorder of a substantialized, passive *res cogitans* of objectification and technical correction, from an analytical perspective or recognizes it as a manifestation of modes existenciéis of being-not-world. As Novaes de Sá (2022, p. 19) explains, "being-there is not related with the world as a subject that becomes an object, but as it always is implicated in sense relations which constitute it".

The affective disposition is not, however, an internal psychological state that would color secondarily our relationship with the world, but to its own structure of openness as always we find ourselves situated in the middle of things and others. Novaes de Sá (2022, p. 20) stresses that "humor is not something we have, but something we are," indicating that affectivity constitutes the mode fundamental than qual we exist. Distress, for example, is not a pathological symptom to be eliminated, but a fundamental disposition which can reveal to Dasein its condition of being-thrown-to-death, confronting-o with his finitude and his freedom.

² He was president of the Society for Hermeneutic Anthropology and *Daseinsanálise*, a Swiss-based institution whose focus is the philosophical deepening of *Daseinsanálise* as existential psychotherapy, especially based on the hermeneutics of Heidegger and Kierkegaard, as well as a critical reading of Freudian psychoanalysis.

This phenomenological understanding of affectivity implies a radical transformation of same sense of clinical practice. Second Novaes de Sá (2022, p. 21), "psychic suffering does not is understood as the result of intrapsychic conflicts or cognitive deficits, more like restriction of existential possibilities". What is traditionally called "symptom" reveals itself, na daseinsanalytic perspective, as a specific mode of inhabiting or world — this mode that can be more or less appropriate, more or less lively, more or less open às possibilities of being.

The analysis proposes, thus, a dislocation of the record of the causal explanation for or hermeneutical understanding. As Novaes de Sá (2022, p. 22) explains, "it is not about looking for as causes of suffering in past events or in unconscious structures, rather than understanding or existential sense two modes of being that manifested themselves are not present". This hermeneutic orientation it does not imply the abandonment of rigor, but the recognition that rigor is appropriate to research of human existence is neither scientific-natural objectification, nor explicit phenomenological two senses that already always orientate our being-not-world.

The Heideggerian notion of care (*Sorge*) is fundamentally articulated with this understanding of affectivity, in quality or care is not an attitude to be feared, but to structure ontological that defines or mode of being do Dasein. As far as being-not-world, or being-there already always cares — of himself, two others, the things. This care is not primarily a concern conscious, more sim or fundamental mode than how we are implicated in existence. Like the author explains, "care is the way in which qual or dasein relates to its own being, always already projected into possibilities and always already situated in a factuality" (NOVAES DE SÁ, 2022, p. 23).

To clinical daseinsanalytic practice is directed, however ea from this author³, hair care as openness to existential uniqueness of each patient to indicate that "the therapist is not that that possesses a technical knowledge of human psychology that applies to that particular case, but that which is disposed to comprehend the singular way in which each existence finds itself thrown into the world" (NOVAES DE SÁ 2022, P. 24). This comprehensive disposition implies a suspension of two prior theoretical pressuposts that would objectify or patient second diagnostic categories universais, opening itself to phenomenal manifestation of suffering as it presents itself in singularity of each existential history.

Clinical daseinsanalytic hermeneutics does not seek, therefore, to discover hidden meanings by behind two manifest symptoms, to further expound the existential senses that always oriented or being-not-

³ A similar fact to the dispersion of the psi field occurs in the daseinnalise, once there are equally different positions in relation to its praxiological and clinical know-how.

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the patient's world, yet in a non-thematized way. As synthesized by Novaes de Sá (2022, p. 26),
"when we feel something we are not able to explain or sense or to dry up
we got to name it, that doesn't mean we don't know at all what it's about. Se
fosse esse or case, sequer we would be acometited by esse affection."

The interpretation in the diagnosis has, therefore, a fundamentally different nature from the so-called
orthodox psychoanalytic⁴ or cognitive-behavioral interpretation. It's not trying to translate
or manifest discourse in a theoretical languagem that would reveal its "true" unconscious sense
or of a dysfunctional thinking, more of explaining and appropriating the existential senses than always
permeiam a experiência, embora possam remain hidden or not appropriate.

This hermeneutic perspective implies that clinical work does not visa to produce
instrumental knowledge about the patient, rather than facilitating a process of existential appropriation.
Second Novaes de Sá (2022, p. 27), the daseinsanalytic interpretation "has much more to nature
of a 'pointing out', 'showing' and explaining than of a deciphering, 'informing' and 'explaining'". The therapist does not
informs ao patient something that this would not know about himself, but points for senses that
always permeating his experience, facilitating his explicitness and appropriation.

A phenomenologically grounded psychology does not seek, however, to objectify *psyche* as such
measurable entity nem interpret symptoms second previous theoretical models of normality or
pathology, but to accompany attentively the affective modes those quais to existence opens or sees
date to its own power-being.

This phenomenological orientation of care allows us to articulate historicity, singularity and
ethics, constituting a vital conduit connecting the Greek, medieval and modern traditions of
thought about to soul, fornecing consistent theoretical subsidies for to understanding
contemporary of the psychological subject as relational, bodily, affective and ethical. A
to analyze, to contextualize the clinical implications of Heideggerian existential analysis,
offers à contemporary psychology a rigorous alternative aos metaphysical reductionisms that
marked its modern emergence, without, thus, abandoning the pretense of scientificity, any more
sim resignifying-a as phenomenological-hermeneutical rigor appropriate to understanding da
complexity of human existence.

⁴ It may be necessary to flex non-plural psychoanalysis, for there is also a field of dispersion between these different
psychoanalyses: some approach more from the intrapsychic-metapsychic model and others, such as relational
psychoanalysis, adopt a new metapsychology in explicit dialogue with authors such as Hans-Georg Gadamer.



FINE CONSIDERATIONS

In the historical-epistemological research traced here, I have tried to prove that the constitution gives psychology as an autonomous discipline did not result from a linear progress of consciousness, but from a field of irreducible tensions between metaphysical and phenomenological orientations.

From the Greek understanding of *psyche* as projected exteriority in actions, passing from Christian and Cartesian interiorization to Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenological openness, a fundamental dialectic between objectification and understanding, between causal explanation and existential hermeneutics. To Cartesian metaphysics, an institute or radical dualism between *res cogitans* and *extensive res*, provided the conditions for psychology to emerge as a positive science consciousness. However, this epistemic gain has as a counterpart to loss of dimension existential of subjectivity. Consciousness, reduced to thinking substance transparent to itself, became the object of an experimental psychology that sought, and continues to seek, in the sciences *naturais* its model of science.

The project of a scientific psychology founded on our Cartesian presumptions encountered, therefore, structural limits: the impossibility of completely objectifying subjectivity without losing it or that a characterizes as such. Kant, to demonstrate that the soul could not be the object of consciousness scientific we ourselves terms that objects give nature, opened the way for another way of understanding. His critique of metaphysical reductionism prepared a ground for which Husserl developed into phenomenology as a rigorous science of two phenomena as they present themselves consciousness, without aprioristic presuppositions about its substantial nature.

At the phenomenological *epoché*, when suspending one's natural attitude, it allowed one to reconduct psychological research to correlation originating between consciousness and world, preceding to tension metaphysics between inner and outer, between subject and object. Heidegger, in turn, radicalized this phenomenological orientation to demonstrate that the question of subjectivity must be reformulated as to give existence. For Heidegger, we do not have a consciousness, but we are integrally consciousness. In this way, *Dasein* is not thinking substance enclosed within, but being-no-world, always situated in the midst of things and others, always open to affective dispositions that constitute it. Or care (*Sorge*) reveals itself as a fundamental ontological structure that articulates temporality, facticity and project, dissolving the metaphysical dichotomies that existed grounded to modern psychology.

Contemporary contributions of *daseins* analysis, particularly Roberto's analyses Knowledge of Sá on the relationship between affection and care demonstrates the fecundity of this guidance phenomenological for to clinical practice. The understanding of psychic suffering as restraint gives



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existential possibilities, and not as a dysfunction of an objective mental apparatus, allows one therapeutic practice that respects the uniqueness of each existence and is oriented toward appropriation hermeneutics two senses that always already permeiam to lived experience. This return movement to things themselves — to being-not-world, to the affective dispositions which constitute us, to temporality which passes us — does not represent abandonment of science, but its expansion.

In this sense, the phenomenological science of existence is no less rigorous than science of metaphysical basis; it is rigorous in a particular way, appropriate to the specificity of its object. Seu rigor consists in fidelity to the phenomenal manifestation of existence, in the suspension of presumptions metaphysicians that to encobririam, in the hermeneutic explanation of the senses that already always us orientam. The relevance of this epistemological discussion is not only theoretical, but also practical. No contemporary context, in which psychology is overtaken by demands for efficacy technique, quantification of outcomes and protocolization of procedures, revisiting its roots phenomenological allows it to resist the tendency to reduce the human to something measurable. The insistence in the qualitative, singular and historical dimension of existence it does not represent philosophical nostalgia, anymore sim an ethical defense of the irreducibility of human complexity to any form of objectification totalizing.

On the other hand, I believe that philosophical reading *per se*, fundamental embora, does not provide a sufficient methodological tecitura to orient or clinical know-fazer. This lacuna feeds minha distress as two constitutive modes of the psychotherapeutic process. Or rather, I perceive that a transposition of the philosophical-epistemological dimension — as in Husserl and Heidegger — for or daily clinical practice remains an open task, which still requires much theoretical maturation and methodological formulations. And why not say also: of certain procedural protocolization?

Finally, it must be acknowledged that the tension between metaphysics and phenomenology was not resolved dialectically in a universal synthesis, but persists as a demanding critical field positioning. Contemporary psychology cannot avoid this epistemological school fundamental and precise to recognize that understanding the human demands modes of investigation radically different from those untransposable paradigmatic encapsulations — be they metaphysical or phenomenological.

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