RCMOS – Revista Científica Multidisciplinar O
Saber. ISSN: 2675-9128. São Paulo - SP.
Ano VII, v.1 2026 | submissão: 01/10/2026 | aceito: 08/10/2026 | publicação: 13/10/2026

Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: Human Control, Accountability and Challenges of International Regulation

Sistemas de armas autônomas e Direito Internacional Humanitário: controle humano, responsabilidade e desafios da regulação internacional

Sistemas de armas autónomas y Derecho Internacional Humanitario: control humano, responsabilidad y desafíos de la regulación internacional

Uesclei Santana Barbosa – uesclei_wl@hotmail.com
Lawyer. Master's degree in Fundamental Rights. Postgraduate qualifications in Consumer Law and Urban and Environmental Law.

Abstract: This article examines the application of international humanitarian law to autonomous weapon systems, focusing on target selection and engagement, human control and accountability. The qualitative documentary study analyses Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, United Nations resolutions and a Secretary-General report, the Rome Statute, the International Law Commission articles on State responsibility and International Committee of the Red Cross documents published up to 7 October 2026. The analysis distinguishes existing rules from institutional proposals for new instruments. Existing law regulates weapons and attacks, but delegating functions to a system creates difficulties in assessing context, anticipating effects and ensuring timely intervention. Legal review of a weapon does not replace assessment of its operational use, and the formal presence of an operator does not demonstrate sufficient control. Responsibility must be assessed under the requirements applicable to States and individuals, without automatically assigning liability to everyone involved. The article concludes that additional prohibitions and restrictions, such as those proposed by the ICRC, may clarify unacceptable uses and verifiable conditions of deployment. These proposals do not constitute an already concluded universal treaty or displace existing humanitarian obligations.
Keywords: autonomous weapons; international humanitarian law; artificial intelligence; human control; accountability.

Resumo: O artigo examina a aplicação do Direito Internacional Humanitário aos sistemas de armas autônomas, com foco na seleção e no engajamento de alvos, no controle humano e na responsabilidade. A pesquisa qualitativa e documental analisa o Protocolo Adicional I às Convenções de Genebra, resoluções e relatório das Nações Unidas, o Estatuto de Roma, os artigos da Comissão de Direito Internacional sobre responsabilidade dos Estados e documentos do Comitê Internacional da Cruz Vermelha publicados até 7 de outubro de 2026. A análise distingue regras vigentes de propostas institucionais para novos instrumentos. O direito existente disciplina os meios de guerra e os ataques, mas a delegação de funções ao sistema cria dificuldades para avaliar o contexto, prever efeitos e assegurar intervenção em tempo útil. A revisão jurídica do armamento não substitui a apreciação de cada operação, e a presença formal de um operador não demonstra controle suficiente. A responsabilidade deve ser examinada segundo os requisitos aplicáveis aos Estados e às pessoas, sem imputação automática a todos os envolvidos. Conclui-se que proibições e restrições adicionais, como as defendidas pelo CICV, podem explicitar usos inadmissíveis e condições verificáveis de emprego. Essas propostas não equivalem a um tratado universal já concluído nem dispensam o cumprimento das normas humanitárias existentes.
Palavras-chave: armas autônomas; Direito Internacional Humanitário; inteligência artificial; controle humano; responsabilidade.

Resumen: Este artículo examina la aplicación del Derecho Internacional Humanitario a los sistemas de armas autónomas, con énfasis en la selección y el ataque de objetivos, el control

humano y la responsabilidad. La investigación cualitativa y documental analiza el Protocolo Adicional I a los Convenios de Ginebra, resoluciones y un informe de las Naciones Unidas, el Estatuto de Roma, los artículos de la Comisión de Derecho Internacional sobre responsabilidad de los Estados y documentos del Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja publicados hasta el 7 de octubre de 2026. El análisis distingue las normas vigentes de las propuestas institucionales de nuevos instrumentos. El derecho existente regula los medios de guerra y los ataques, pero la delegación de funciones al sistema crea dificultades para evaluar el contexto, prever los efectos y garantizar una intervención oportuna. La revisión jurídica del armamento no sustituye la apreciación de cada operación y la presencia formal de un operador no demuestra un control suficiente. La responsabilidad debe examinarse según los requisitos aplicables a los Estados y a las personas, sin imputación automática a todos los involucrados. Se concluye que prohibiciones y restricciones adicionales, como las defendidas por el CICR, pueden explicitar usos inadmisibles y condiciones verificables de empleo. Estas propuestas no equivalen a un tratado universal ya concluido ni dispensan del cumplimiento de las normas humanitarias existentes.
Palabras clave: armas autónomas; Derecho Internacional Humanitario; inteligencia artificial; control humano; responsabilidad.

1. Introduction

Systems that perform attack functions after human activation have made control over the use of force a central issue in discussions of military technology. For the ICRC, the concern arises from delegating target selection and the application of force to processes that respond to the environment. The autonomy relevant to this debate is measured not by the platform's appearance, but by the decisions that remain subject to human judgement and the functions transferred to the system (ICRC, 2026a).

The problem has acquired relevance beyond technological speculation. On 25 August 2026, the United Nations Secretary-General and the ICRC President renewed the call for specific rules on autonomous weapon systems. The statement identifies autonomous targeting of force against people as a central humanitarian concern, but it is a call for regulation, not proof that a universal treaty has already been concluded (ICRC, 2026d).

The central question of this article is the extent to which existing international humanitarian law (IHL) can govern such systems and why demand for additional prohibitions and restrictions is growing even though current rules apply. The legal problem cannot be framed as a simplistic opposition between technology and humanity. The analysis must consider possible operational benefits, such as precision and reduced exposure of combatants, as well as limits of predictability, data quality, behaviour in complex environments, escalation risks and the need for contextualised human decisions.

The objective is to examine the application of IHL to autonomous weapon systems, the challenges concerning distinction, proportionality, precautions and responsibility, and the course of international regulation between 2024 and 2026.

2. Methodology

The research adopts a qualitative approach and documentary procedure. The corpus comprises Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, General Assembly resolutions and a report of the United Nations Secretary-General, the Rome Statute, the International Law Commission's articles on State responsibility and institutional positions of the ICRC. Documents concerning negotiations under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) are examined through ICRC statements, without attempting to reconstruct the entire work of the Group of Governmental Experts.

The scope covers documents available up to 7 October 2026, including Resolutions 79/62 and 80/57 and report A/79/88. Treaty rules are examined according to their fields of application and are not presented, solely by virtue of that character, as binding on every State. The study compares their requirements with difficulties discussed by the ICRC and assesses the scope of proposals for additional regulation, without conducting a systematic literature review or technical testing of weapons.

The examination separates three levels: existing legal obligations, difficulties of application arising from autonomy and proposals for additional regulation. The operational scenarios used throughout are analytical examples, not incident reports or technical assessments of commercial models. The research does not test system accuracy and does not seek to replace legal review of a specific weapon.

3. Autonomy in critical functions and the application of law

The ICRC defines these systems by their performance of attack functions: after activation, the equipment identifies situations matching its parameters and applies force without renewed human authorisation for each target. Sensors provide environmental data, while a predetermined profile guides the response. This definition locates the legal problem in the interval between mission configuration and the actual occurrence of the attack (ICRC, 2026a).

The functional criterion avoids two confusions. The first is equating autonomy with the physical absence of an operator: a remotely piloted platform may depend on human authorisation for every attack. The second is equating autonomy with artificial intelligence. Functions can be performed without further intervention through pre-programmed rules, while an artificial intelligence program may merely provide information to the decision-maker. The legal object of analysis is the delegation of selection and engagement, not the presence of a technology bearing a particular name (ICRC, 2026a).

Autonomy varies with the delegated function. One program may recommend targets and leave the decision to attack to a person; another may perform selection and engagement following an initial authorisation. Under the functional approach adopted by the ICRC, the second possibility is the main regulatory concern. The less the initial decision anticipates the circumstances in which force will be applied, the greater the need to examine mission limits, predictability and intervention capacity (ICRC, 2026a).

This definition also prevents all military automation from being equated with lethal autonomy. A remotely controlled drone, for example, may be non-autonomous in its attack decision if a human operator identifies the target and authorises each use of force. Regulatory debate focuses particularly on systems in which that specific choice is delegated to computational processes.

This distinction affects the assessment of control. If the operator authorises each attack, the system assists an individualised decision; if the operator authorises a mission using a generic target profile, force may later be applied to situations that were not specifically examined. The analysis must then identify which assumptions were assessed at activation and how long they remain valid. Initial authorisation does not by itself respond to changes in the environment.

The use of autonomous systems remains subject to rules applicable to means and methods of warfare. In armed conflict, IHL limits the use of force regardless of the technology employed. This premise appears in the ICRC's March 2026 document on autonomous systems and in General Assembly Resolution 79/62, which reaffirms the application of international law (ICRC, 2026a; United Nations, 2024b).

Legality requires examination of the weapon and its conditions of use. Additional Protocol I prohibits indiscriminate attacks and constrains the choice of means of warfare; its rules do not depend on an express reference to artificial intelligence. Technological novelty therefore does not dispense with verifying whether a system can be directed at a military

RCMOS – Revista Científica Multidisciplinar O
Saber. ISSN: 2675-9128. São Paulo - SP.
Ano VII, v.1 2026 | submissão: 01/10/2026 | aceito: 08/10/2026 | publicação: 13/10/2026

objective and whether its effects remain limited as required by applicable law (Brazil, 1993, Protocol I, arts. 35 and 51).

Application of existing law, however, does not eliminate every problem. Many IHL rules presuppose contextual human assessments during the planning and conduct of attacks. When an algorithm identifies a target from a generic profile and applies force at a time and place not specifically selected by the operator, the question arises of how to ensure that earlier legal judgements remain valid at the actual moment of attack.

The scope of this study must also be defined. IHL governs the conduct of hostilities in armed conflicts; by itself, it does not determine the lawfulness of recourse to force between States or every use of force outside conflict. In addition to IHL, Resolution 79/62 mentions the United Nations Charter and human rights. This article's focus on humanitarian protection must not be read as excluding those other regimes when they apply (United Nations, 2024b).

The initial conclusion is therefore limited but relevant: autonomy does not displace existing law, but changes the conditions under which its commands must be fulfilled. The next question is whether the responsible person has sufficient information and control to apply legal criteria when the system produces its effects.

4. Distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack

The principle of distinction guides identification of persons and objects that may be attacked. In Additional Protocol I, this protection appears in the general rule of Article 48 and provisions concerning civilians, military objectives and persons hors de combat. Assessment must track relevant changes: a combatant may cease participating because of injury or surrender, and the presence of civilians may alter operational conditions. Technical recognition of an appearance therefore does not exhaust the legal inquiry (Brazil, 1993, Protocol I, arts. 41, 48, 51 and 52).

For objects, Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I requires two related assessments: their contribution to military action and the definite military advantage expected from the measure in the circumstances ruling at the time. Contribution may arise from an object's nature, location, purpose or use. A vehicle classified by a program as resembling military equipment does not become a lawful target merely because of that resemblance. It is necessary to verify that the classification corresponds to the concrete situation (Brazil, 1993, Protocol I, art. 52(2)).

RCMOS – Revista Científica Multidisciplinar O
Saber. ISSN: 2675-9128. São Paulo - SP.
Ano VII, v.1 2026 | submissão: 01/10/2026 | aceito: 08/10/2026 | publicação: 13/10/2026

Consider, as an analytical hypothesis, a system activated to locate a type of vehicle within a particular area. Even if it recognises the appearance correctly, the object's use, location and the presence of civilians may change. The problem is not only misclassification: a technically correct classification may fail to provide enough information to decide whether the attack is lawful. The rule requires assessment of the situation, not merely correspondence with a profile.

The proportionality rule prohibits attacks when expected incidental harm to civilians or civilian objects would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Its application is prospective and depends on information available for the decision. Automated data processing may assist estimates, but it does not remove the need to assess the situation under this normative limit (Brazil, 1993, Protocol I, arts. 51(5)(b) and 57(2)).

The same care applies to proportionality. Automated estimates may assist assessment of civilian presence or weapon range, but do not remove the need to determine the anticipated military advantage and evaluate incidental harm. Even a precise system may participate in a disproportionate attack. Precision of the means and lawfulness of the decision are different dimensions; the former does not prove the latter (Brazil, 1993, Protocol I, arts. 51 and 57).

Precautions require diligence in verifying the target and choosing means of attack to avoid or reduce harm to civilians. They also require abstention, suspension or cancellation in the situations defined by Article 57. With autonomous systems, these duties make knowledge of capabilities, limitations and operating conditions relevant: authorisation issued without sufficient information may not support the assessment required by law (Brazil, 1993, Protocol I, art. 57; ICRC, 2026a).

Article 57 links this assessment to the course of the attack by requiring cancellation or suspension when information reveals a non-military target, special protection or excessive incidental harm. Delegation creates a particular difficulty: new information must reach someone able to act, and intervention must be possible in time. A mechanism that allows the system to be switched off only after force has been applied does not satisfy this preventive requirement (Brazil, 1993, Protocol I, art. 57).

This conclusion does not mean that every autonomous application necessarily produces a violation. It means that compliance depends on conditions of use and the capacity to deal with uncertainty. Restricting a mission to defined targets, areas and periods may reduce relevant variables, but the sufficiency of those limits must be demonstrated for the

operational context. Generic approval based on good average performance does not answer situations of specific risk.

For applications not subject to its recommended prohibitions, the ICRC proposes limits on targets, area, duration and scale, accompanied by supervision and a capacity for deactivation. These measures seek to reduce uncertainty, which grows in complex environments and in the presence of civilians. For this study, their value lies in linking authorisation for use to verifiable conditions, without assuming that any technical limit is sufficient to prove compliance (ICRC, 2021; ICRC, 2026a).

5. Legal review, human control and responsibility

Article 36 of Additional Protocol I requires a State Party to conduct a prior legal compatibility review when studying or acquiring a new weapon, means or method of warfare. The review must consider whether there are circumstances in which its use would be prohibited or whether the prohibition covers all applications. This obligation prevents acquisition decisions from being treated as exclusively technical or strategic matters (Brazil, 1993, Protocol I, art. 36).

For autonomous systems, assessment must address the characteristics that condition their effects. The ICRC analysis includes predictability, operational limits and the ability to understand weapon behaviour. Sensors, programs and data, when relevant to the attack function, form part of the review. Updates capable of changing those characteristics require attention to the conditions under which approval was granted, rather than treatment of the original configuration as permanent authorisation (ICRC, 2026a).

As a proposal for operationalising this review, the examination should consider adverse situations compatible with intended use: loss of information, interference, environmental conditions and recognition failures. The legal question is whether such scenarios change the capacity to limit effects and comply with applicable obligations. Tests depend on the system and context; no universal technical validation protocol is proposed here (Brazil, 1993, Protocol I, art. 36; ICRC, 2026a).

Review of a means of warfare and assessment of an attack perform different functions. The first determines whether and under what conditions the weapon may be used; the second evaluates its use in a concrete situation. A weapon approved for certain circumstances does not automatically make every attack lawful. This separation is essential to prevent the Article

36 procedure from becoming unlimited operational authorisation (Brazil, 1993, Protocol I, art. 36).

As an analytical consequence, authorisation of an autonomous system should specify the conditions supporting the review's result. Relevant changes in sensors, software or target profile may affect those conditions. Article 36 does not technically describe every possible update; the need to reassess relevant changes follows from the purpose of verifying the compatibility of the means and its use with applicable law.

Legal responsibility cannot be transferred to a machine. Resolution 80/57 reaffirms the importance of the human role in the use of force and of accountability, in accordance with international law. A chain of command must in turn be accompanied by effective conditions for understanding, limiting and interrupting system use. Contemporary debate therefore requires assessment of the quality and context of the control exercised, beyond the formal presence of an operator (United Nations, 2025; ICRC, 2026a).

In the ICRC's position, preserving human control requires delimiting the mission and maintaining conditions of supervision and intervention suited to use of the system. Selection of targets, area and duration must be accompanied by knowledge of capabilities and limitations. An emergency command without the time or information needed to use it does not by itself demonstrate sufficient control. Assessment must consider what the responsible person can actually understand and change before force is applied (ICRC, 2021; ICRC, 2026a).

The presence of a person in the operational circuit must also be considered in that context. The ICRC relates compliance with obligations to human judgement and control, not to the mere existence of an operator. From this premise, this study considers it necessary to verify access to information, authority to act and response time. These criteria do not make every individualised authorisation lawful; they make it possible to assess whether supervision offers real conditions for responsible decisions (ICRC, 2026a).

Identification of a technical failure does not automatically prove a crime by a commander or developer. Individual attribution depends on specific requirements, such as the conduct attributed, the legal duty and the required mental element. Articles 25, 28 and 30 of the Rome Statute regulate forms of responsibility and their conditions. A connection with development or use of the weapon does not replace proof of those elements or by itself expand the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (United Nations, 1998, arts. 25, 28 and 30).

The distribution of tasks among acquisition, development, command and operation requires reconstruction of who decided and under what conditions. Depending on the applicable regime, a failure may give rise to State responsibility, individual responsibility or both, but the conclusion requires a separate examination. Records of configuration, authorisations and interventions are therefore relevant to the investigative approach proposed here. Their existence assists investigation without determining its outcome in advance (United Nations, 1998; United Nations, 2001).

International responsibility of the State and individual criminal responsibility are distinct levels. Under the International Law Commission's articles, a State wrongful act requires conduct attributable to the State and breach of an international obligation; under the Rome Statute, individual responsibility depends on the relevant criminal and jurisdictional requirements. Article 25(4) expressly preserves this separation. The Commission's articles were adopted in 2001 as a codification text, not as an autonomous treaty. Weapon complexity may make proof more difficult, but it does not transfer responsibility to the machine (United Nations, 2001, art. 2; United Nations, 1998, art. 25(4)).

Records of mission parameters, interventions and operating conditions may help reconstruct events. Explainability relevant to law need not be reduced to full disclosure of every internal calculation; what matters is understanding the functioning and limits needed for decision-making and later investigation. These are proposals for operationalising the duties examined, whose technical configuration should be defined according to the system and authorised use.

6. The ethical problem and assessment of claimed benefits

The debate is not exclusively legal. Replacing human judgement with automated processing in life-and-death decisions creates a distinct ethical concern. The ICRC argues that loss of human control and judgement in applying force threatens the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience, especially when systems are designed to apply force directly against people (ICRC, 2021).

The ethical objection is not exhausted by the equipment's accuracy rate. A decision may be technically predictable yet remain open to criticism because it delegates application of force against people to a process without specific human judgement. This distinction helps explain why the ICRC position includes a proposed prohibition of systems directed against persons in addition to concern over unpredictable effects (ICRC, 2021).

The debate combines expectations of speed, precision and reduced exposure of troops with concerns about harm, loss of human judgement and escalation. Report A/79/88 records differing positions, and the ICRC highlights risks arising from difficulty in anticipating and limiting effects. This article treats those benefits as possibilities under discussion, not as proven advantages of every autonomous system. Their assessment depends on the equipment, the mission and the alternative use against which comparison is made (United Nations, 2024a; ICRC, 2026a).

The ethical discussion therefore reinforces the need to distinguish applications. Limited autonomy for defence against clearly identifiable military objects in a controlled environment does not present the same risks as a system designed to search for and attack people in an urban area. International regulation is likely to require this differentiation.

7. International negotiations and proposals for prohibitions and restrictions

The Secretary-General's report A/79/88, published in July 2024 after consultations with States and other actors, compiled positions on the challenges of autonomous weapons. Its contributions do not form a single legal opinion: they record concerns and proposals from different participants. The document helps identify convergence and divergence, but should not be cited as though every submission it contains were the Secretary-General's own conclusion (United Nations, 2024a).

Resolution 79/62 was adopted by the General Assembly on 2 December 2024 and circulated on 10 December. It reaffirms the application of international law, recognises risks and potential technological benefits and calls for continued discussion. In 2025, Resolution 80/57 kept the issue on the agenda. These acts do not in themselves constitute a specific treaty prohibiting all autonomous weapons (United Nations, 2024b; United Nations, 2025).

In August 2026, the ICRC submitted to the CCW Group of Governmental Experts a paper on elements for a future binding instrument. The institution considered that the text then under discussion offered a sufficient basis for negotiations and recommended adding a prohibition on autonomous targeting of persons and a restriction to military objectives by nature. This is an institutional position on the negotiations and must not be presented as a consensus conclusion of all States (ICRC, 2026c).

The document taken by the ICRC to the First Committee of the General Assembly in October 2026 again included the issue among its disarmament concerns. The sequence demonstrates continuity in its action, but does not authorise the conclusion that negotiations

will necessarily produce a treaty within a given period. The outcome depends on State positions and the legal form ultimately agreed (ICRC, 2026b).

This trajectory must be read by distinguishing the legal force and political value of the documents. A General Assembly resolution may reaffirm existing rules and advance negotiations, but does not automatically become a specific treaty. An ICRC document provides the interpretation and recommendations of an institution with a humanitarian mandate without representing the position of all participants. This article uses these materials to analyse the direction of debate while preserving the authorship and scope of each statement.

The ICRC position distinguishes systems whose effects cannot be sufficiently understood, predicted and explained, systems autonomously directed against persons and other applications capable of restriction. It recommends prohibiting the first two groups and regulating the others through limits on targets, duration, area, scale and human interaction. This proposal must be identified as a recommendation for new rules and not confused with an existing universal prohibition on all autonomy in weapons (ICRC, 2021).

The difference between prohibition and restriction also requires precision. The proposed prohibition bars a class of use; restriction delimits the conditions for employing other applications. In the latter group, declaring the existence of human control is not enough: rules must define which targets may be selected, the area and period in which the system operates, and how operation will be interrupted. Without verifiable conditions, the normative formula risks remaining abstract.

This approach has a legal and operational advantage: it does not treat all autonomy as unlawful, but concentrates prohibitions where the risk of incompatibility with humanity and IHL is greatest, while reserving a control regime for other applications. It also preserves space for defensive or precision technologies that may reduce harm when used in appropriate circumstances.

In advocating this architecture, the study does not assume that every weapon directed at an object is lawful or that every application against persons is already expressly prohibited by a specific universal rule on autonomy. Systems directed at objects remain subject to distinction, proportionality and precautions; uses incompatible with those rules remain prohibited under existing law. The scope of an additional prohibition depends on the instrument ultimately adopted.

The positions examined leave questions open concerning definition, the scope of prohibitions and the form of the instrument. The ICRC proposal offers guidance for this

debate: preserve human judgement and limit applications whose effects cannot be sufficiently anticipated. This study considers that regulation should translate these goals into verifiable conditions for development and use. This is an analytical conclusion based on that institutional position, without presuming consensus among all States (ICRC, 2021; ICRC, 2026c).

Additional regulation may make explicit conditions of compliance that currently require case-by-case interpretation. Its value should be assessed by its ability to guide development, review, training and oversight. Agreement on words such as predictability and human control, without implementation criteria, does not resolve the central difficulty of ensuring responsible decisions in concrete situations.

8. Final considerations

The examination demonstrates that autonomy in selection and engagement functions does not displace the application of international humanitarian law. Difficulties arise in maintaining the conditions needed to comply with its commands: a generic target profile is not equivalent to assessing a military objective, and technical precision does not prove proportionality. Legality must be analysed in relation to the system, the mission and changes that may occur between activation and application of force.

Legal review of weapons, operational planning and the possibility of human intervention perform complementary functions. Approval of the means does not replace assessment of the attack, just as the formal presence of an operator does not demonstrate sufficient control. Responsibility remains governed by regimes applicable to States and individuals, without automatic attribution to all agents or transfer to the machine.

The documents examined up to October 2026 show continuity in the debate on new rules, but do not permit the ICRC proposals to be presented as an already concluded universal treaty. Within that limit, a combination of prohibitions and restrictions offers relevant guidance: make unacceptable uses and verifiable conditions of deployment explicit. The legal contribution of additional regulation will lie in preserving human judgement and responsibility for the use of force through parameters capable of application and oversight.

References

BRASIL. Decreto nº 849, de 25 de junho de 1993. Promulga os Protocolos I e II de 1977 adicionais às Convenções de Genebra de 1949. Brasília, DF: Presidência da República, 1993.

Disponível em: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/1990-1994/d0849.htm. Acesso em: 7 out. 2026.

COMITÊ INTERNACIONAL DA CRUZ VERMELHA (CICV). Autonomous weapon systems and international humanitarian law: selected issues. Geneva, 2026a. Disponível em: https://www.icrc.org/en/article/autonomous-weapon-systems-and-international- humanitarian-law-selected-issues. Acesso em: 7 out. 2026.

COMITÊ INTERNACIONAL DA CRUZ VERMELHA (CICV). ICRC position on autonomous weapon systems. Geneva, 12 maio 2021. Disponível em: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-position-autonomous-weapon-systems. Acesso em: 7 out. 2026.

COMITÊ INTERNACIONAL DA CRUZ VERMELHA (CICV). ICRC submits Working Paper to the United Nations General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 81st session (2026). 1 out. 2026b. Disponível em: https://www.icrc.org/en/article/icrc-submits-working-paper-united-nations-general-assembly-general-assembly-first-committee-disarmament-and-international-security. Acesso em: 7 out. 2026.

COMITÊ INTERNACIONAL DA CRUZ VERMELHA (CICV). ICRC working paper on critical elements for inclusion in a legally binding instrument to regulate autonomous weapon systems. 28 ago. 2026c. Disponível em: https://www.icrc.org/en/article/icrc-working- paper-regulate-autonomous-weapon-systems. Acesso em: 7 out. 2026.

COMITÊ INTERNACIONAL DA CRUZ VERMELHA (CICV). Renewed call from UN Secretary-General and ICRC President to adopt rules on autonomous weapon systems. 25 ago. 2026d. Disponível em: https://www.icrc.org/en/statement/renewed-call-un-secretary-general-and-icrc-president-adopt-rules-autonomous-weapons. Acesso em: 7 out. 2026.

NAÇÕES UNIDAS. Comissão de Direito Internacional. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 2001. Disponível em: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf. Acesso em: 7 out. 2026.

NAÇÕES UNIDAS. Lethal autonomous weapons systems: report of the Secretary- General. A/79/88. New York, 1 jul. 2024a. Disponível em: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4059475. Acesso em: 7 out. 2026.

NAÇÕES UNIDAS. Resolution 79/62: Lethal autonomous weapons systems. New York, 10 dez. 2024b. Disponível em: https://docs.un.org/A/RES/79/62. Acesso em: 7 out. 2026.

NAÇÕES UNIDAS. Resolution 80/57: Lethal autonomous weapons systems. New York, 5 dez. 2025. Disponível em: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4095989. Acesso em: 7 out. 2026.

NAÇÕES UNIDAS. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Rome, 17 jul. 1998. Disponível em: https://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm. Acesso em: 7 out. 2026.